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Abstract (for the combined three Parts) 
This paper presents the simplest known theory of processes involved in a person’s unconscious 
and conscious achievements such as intending, perceiving, reacting and thinking. The basic 
principle is that an individual has mental states which possess quantitative causal powers and are 
susceptible to influences from other mental states. Mental performance discriminates the present 
level of a situational feature from its level in an individually acquired, multiple featured norm 
(exemplar, template, standard). The effect on output of a moderate disparity between input and 
norm is scaled in a universal unit of discrimination (Weber’s fraction), with the norm’s level 
being zero. When one process converts separate sources of input into an output, their 
discriminative distances from norm are summated. Distinct processes converging on an output 
combine their discriminations from norm orthogonally. An output may be influenced by other 
outputs as well as by inputs. Descriptive performance is the influence of one category of input on 
a verbal output. Reasoning is minimally the effect of one verbal process on another. In deeper 
mental processing, the influence on a response comes from a concept modulating a description: 
this process gives the meaning to an emotion or a motive. Descriptive modulation of stimulation 
corresponds to a bodily sensation or other conceptualized percept. When an output is explained 
solely by sources of input, that response to the stimulation may be mediated unconsciously.  
Development of a person within physical and communal environments embodies such mental 
causation within material causation and acculturates that mind to social causation.  
 
Keywords: personal cognition, mental causation, discrimination scaling, representational 
templates,  
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Part One  
 
How a mind works.   
I. Historical and methodological roots of a fundamental theory 
 
Abstract 
An innovative theory of how an individual’s mind works can be rooted in the first quantitative 
psychological discovery, made in the early 1840s.  E.H. Weber found that the minimum 
distinguishable increase in strength of a physical stimulus was constant fraction over a wide 
range of medium strengths. That result was extended by him and others to many sensory 
modalities. Yet it was grossly misunderstood by Fechner (1960) and by non-psychologists and 
some psychologists to this day, as a way of connecting contents of consciousness such as 
sensations to the material universe. In fact, Weber’s finding provides a means of measuring the 
mental processes that account for an individual’s psychological performance, including the 
highly sophisticated achievement of awareness. Weber’s fraction provides a universal unit of 
measurement of the distances of variants of a situation from the structured standard that the 
individual brings to a particular occasion as they affect the individual’s actions and reactions at 
the time. 
 
 
General Introduction 
The thesis of this three-part paper is that each mind is a determinate causal system, normally 
having a capacity to act from reason. This re-entrant network of mental causation is distinct from 
causal systems in the environment, either material or societal. Yet an individual’s mind develops 
from both the biological universe and the social universe, and that embodied and acculturated 
system lives on while grounded in physicality and symbolic culture. The paper expounds the 
simplest logic yet proposed for understanding how such a mind works, consciously and 
unconsciously.  
Each elemental causal process within a mind transforms its incoming pattern directly into its 
outgoing pattern. Perceptual performance extracts its mental input patterns from the 
environment. Intentional performance covers that environment with its mental output patterns. In 
contrast, the outputs from perception and the inputs to intention are covert, influencing and 
influenced by other processing around the causal network of that mind. At least some of these 
covert input/output functions and their interactions can be characterized by calculations from 
observed social and material sources of information for perception (stimuli) and sinks of 
information for intention (responses). The second paper in this series of three on how a mind 
works specifies the straightforward but extensive arithmetic required. Hypotheses from such a 
theory can be tested against appropriately designed accumulation of observations in particular 
situations, with or without experimental intervention. 
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The calculations start by relating the observed levels of each distinct environmental sink and 
source in the individual’s present situation. In experimental psychology, these overt 
response/stimulus relationships are familiar from factorial analysis of variance and 
psychophysical functions, for example. In observational multivariate research, they correspond 
to the hypothetical paths between measurement variables in structural modeling (Pearl, 2000). 
With categorical rather than quantitative sources, these overt functions have affinities to conjoint 
analysis (Luce & Tukey, 1964) and item response theory (cp. van der Maas, Molenaar, Maris et 
al., 2011).  
However, those other designs and analyses combine data across individuals and sessions. 
The present approach treats seriously each response/stimulus data pair as it is generated by an 
individual in a specific situation. Furthermore, these calculations exhaust the interpretative 
potential of the completed set of data for that individual’s session. The best fitting hypothesis 
characterises the dynamic structure of the mental causation by which the individual has dealt 
with the situation as tested. Generalisation across individuals and/or situations is based on the 
performance characteristics measured by these models of situated personal cognition. 
This radically individualized approach to psychology provides the most basic theory and 
method available for the study of mental achievements of all kinds by embodied and acculturated 
systems, natural or artificial. It is a foundation for fully specified theories of human action, 
reaction, attention, perception, memory, thought, and the comprehension of linguistic and other 
communications.  
Discrimination from personal norm 
Weber’s discovery 
The reputedly first major finding in experimental psychology was reported by E. H. Weber 
in 1834 (Ross & Murray, 1996). Weber measured the minimum distinguishable fraction of 
pressure from a weight or of distance between two points on the skin. He found the fraction to be 
approximately constant at moderate pressures or distances. Constancy of Weber’s fraction in 
medium ranges was replicated by Weber and many others across the sensory modalities. Hence 
the finding is not only robust; it is also very general. Weber’s fraction should be regarded as a 
foundational discovery of psychological science. Unfortunately, however, the principle was 
misunderstood and misused almost from the start. The approach expounded in this paper rescues 
the Weber fraction, to put it at the cornerstone of measurement of the dynamic structure of an 
individual’s mental processing. 
For millennia, the distinction between a person’s mental life (the psyche or personal soul) 
and that person’s bodily life, and also social life, has been assumed by most thinkers to be 
between the contents of consciousness and the material universe, and/or between awareness of 
self-identity and of societal institutions and culture. Nevertheless, it has also long been 
recognised that some mental processes are irretrievably unconscious, such as the implicit pattern-
translating processes required for achievements like remembering the public past, articulating 
comprehensible speech, and perceiving colour. Yet to this day, some parts of psychology fail to 
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distinguish between such objective mental performance and the subjectively experienced 
phenomenology (which itself can also be treated as an achievement). In related academic 
disciplines, such as philosophy of mind, integrative neuroscience and social anthropology, the 
subject matter of psychology has almost universally been considered to be limited to the 
conscious mind.  
Weber himself appears not to have been clear that he was measuring discriminative 
performance. His name for the observed fraction was a “just noticeable difference” (Weber, 
1834/1996). This concept of noticing a difference can be understood to presuppose the awareness 
of two intensities of a private sensation. That subjectivist interpretation of Weber’s fraction was 
taken up by G. T. Fechner as a means of building a bridge between the material world that 
stimulates the senses and a mental world that each of us experiences. In contrast, the present 
paper takes the experiencing or not of a particular sensation as an issue requiring additional 
evidence (as illustrated in the section on types of mental process).  
Fechner (1860) proposed that intensities of sensation were equivalent to concatenations of 
Weber’s fraction, which he claimed yielded a logarithmic scale. His logic is subject to many 
criticisms (Luce & Edwards, 1958). The point that concerns us here, though, is that the claim 
flew in the face of Weber’s discovery that the minimum discriminated fraction increased at both 
low and high levels of physical stimulation. In the present approach, the working principle that 
discriminative acuity is at a constant fraction is applied only to moderate ranges of sensory 
stimulation. Furthermore, the zero of that scale of discriminated disparities is found to be within 
the range of physical stimulation in which Weber’s fraction is constant. Hence it is irrelevant that 
logarithmic values lack a finite point for zero quantity. 
Fechner’s implicit personal norm 
Fechner (1860) converted the theoretical concatenation of fractions into an equation that 
related judgments of strength of stimulation to the logarithm of physical quantities of the 
stimulus. That is, when Weber’s minimum (increasing) fraction from stimulus level SO to level 
SN is expressed as (SN – SO) / SO for a quantitative response RN, Fechner’s equation is RN = 
k.logSN + c. Only the varied levels of response and stimulus appear in the equation. It does not 
include the value of a basal level of stimulation (SO), nor the sizes of the responses (RO) to 
samples of that presumed constant stimulus. Yet the equation is interpreted as observed 
responses (RN) that judge the degree of difference of each presented sample of the varied 
stimulus (SN) from the same standard stimulus (SO). Hence, considered as a measure of 
discriminative performance, Fechner’s semi-logarithmic equation presupposes a fully functional 
standard held in the participant’s mind from before the first test stimulus, and maintained 
throughout the session that provided the data captured by the equation.  
Thurstone (1927a,b) made this presupposition explicit in his principle and methods of 
comparison to a standard. In a common procedure for measuring discriminative acuity, each 
sample of one of the varied levels of the stimulus is presented alongside a sample of a constant 
stimulus, unidentified as such. The participant is instructed to respond with a comparison 
between the two samples after examining each. Responses to the samples of the standard by 
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itself are not required by Thurstonian analyses or in the calculation of Weber’s fraction 
(Torgerson, 1958).  
The investigator might endeavour to set a standard level of stimulation by presenting an 
identified modulus before the first test sample. Yet that setting would have to be remembered 
exactly throughout the session if Fechner’s equation (or any other psychophysical ‘law’) is to be 
valid for the judgments performed on the varied stimuli. Hence it was proposed instead that each 
participant’s own well established, long-term memory be explicitly invoked in each quantitative 
judgment on a test stimulus, in a series in which levels are kept within the range of constancy of 
Weber’s fraction (Booth, Thompson & Shahedian, 1983; compare McBride, 1983). Even without 
such an experimental design, participants can construct remarkably precise and stable implicit 
standards or norms from the initial test stimuli (e.g., Barsalou, 1985; Morgan, Watamaniuk & 
McKee, 2000; Nachmias, 2006; Stewart, Brown & Chater, 2005).  
An initial explicit standard might help to fine-tune that construction from long-term memory 
(Mobini, Platts & Booth, 2011; also see Conner, Booth, Clifton & Griffiths, 1988a). Indeed, 
learning from scratch is unlikely to occur unless the test situation is so artificial that exposure in 
life is of no use in carrying out the task (Stewart et al., 2005). In other words, working memory 
and perception are thoroughly interdependent (see, for example: Gao, Gao, Li et al., 2011; Pan, 
Cheng & Luo, 2012; Soto, Heinke, Humphreys & Blanco, 2005). Indeed, such learning is a 
logical prerequisite of any functional interaction with a changing environment. During 
development, categories of entity in the environment and also of each entity’s features have to be 
constructed from physical and social input and output. In other words, the multiple-featured 
norms are dynamically stable templates acquired by personal experience of exemplars to date.  
The participant’s own implicit standard is also presupposed by modern theory of detecting 
minimum strengths of stimulation (Tanner, Wilson & Swets, 1954). In accord with Thurstone 
(1927a), the participant in a detection experiment is provided with unidentified samples of the 
constant stimulus of background noise as well as samples of varied levels of the stimulation 
under test. Nevertheless, at the moment that the test sample is present and being judged for 
presence or absence of the stimulus, the participant must operate with a previously acquired 
construct of the presence of noise alone. With some sorts of stimuli, it may be feasible to receive 
two signals simultaneously. Nevertheless many successful comparisons are made between 
successive momentary presentations. Indeed, some common experimental designs preclude 
simultaneous inspection of the two stimuli.   
Detection tasks are widely used, even when discrimination from norm is data-analytically 
more efficient (Macmillan & Creelman, 2008).  Furthermore, detection of the presence of a 
stimulus (or ‘absolute threshold’) may not even be relevant in daily life except as the indicator of 
a potential emergency. The quantity of a stimulus usually matters much more than merely its 
presence. Discrimination is as validly and reliably measured as detection is, if the method takes 
account of the functional situation (Curio, 1994).  
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Discrimination between the personal norm and the test situation 
The feature’s level in the learned norm 
The internal standard required for performance on a psychophysical function is brought to 
centre stage by this paper’s theory of personal cognition and behaviour. The presupposition is 
that each participant has already acquired a template or norm for the situation that is simulated 
by the investigator’s design of the session of tests. Hence the norm has a particular level of each 
learned feature of the situation. The level in the norm is compared with the level at each test in 
which that feature is salient, whether or not a feature is verbally conceptualized in the responses 
to the tested samples. This approach unites the apparently rival theories of recognition of an 
object by matching to a template or by integrating the object’s features (Booth, 1994b; Booth & 
Freeman, 1993). It is the psychophysical (response/stimulus) version of one psychometric 
(response patterning) theory of object category recognition (Nosofsky, 1986). A theory of 
reference points has also been deployed to explain dependence of the speed of comparison on the 
match between criterion concept and the range of stimuli (Holyoak, 1978). 
The pure stimulus classically used in psychophysics is assumed to be assimilated to a feature 
of a previously experienced situation. Those familiar situations have other categories of feature 
which the test stimuli lack or have at fixed levels. Thus a pure solution of sugar might be 
assessed as though it were poorly flavored lemonade. A looming circle may be processed much 
like an approaching motor vehicle. A loud roar might be perceived as the noise of a jumbo jet 
overhead, coming down to land. A volatile compound can be given a culturally established name 
if the levels of stimulation of several olfactory receptors are sufficiently similar to those 
stimulated by the mixture of compounds released into the air by a familiar flower, food or other 
material having a distinctive smell (cp. Stevenson & Boakes, 2003; Stevenson, Case & Boakes, 
2005).   
On this theory, the linear Weber-Fechner function of response on stimulus arises from 
objective judgments of disparities between the tested levels of the stimulus feature and its level 
in the norm. If judgments have indeed been anchored on the familiar version of the test situation, 
the standard level of a feature category can be determined by interpolating to the stimulus value 
for the central tendency of responses at that anchor point (Booth et al., 1983; Conner, Land & 
Booth, 1987).  
Discrimination distances from norm  
The final step in calculating each response-stimulus function is to convert the stimulus scale 
into number of Weber fractions below or above the norm level. This maps the achievement of 
the participant’s quantitative response to each stimulus sample onto a point at a distance from the 
norm in a universal unit of discrimination. Categorically distinct response-stimulus functions can 
then be related directly to each other, despite the diverse scales of measurement of levels of the 
stimuli and any variations in the format required for responses.  
This scaling of each sample on a distance from the norm squeezes every last drop of causally 
relevant information from each observed data-pair. The samples’ distances from norm measure 
the complete and exact content of the information extracted from the stimulus and emitted by the 
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response. That contrasts with purely probabilistic characterisation in its various forms: those 
derivations measure only the amount of information processed.  
Hence norm-zeroed discrimination scaling starts to fill a huge gap in basic theory of 
information. The unit of information, a ‘bit’, measures only the quantity of information 
transmitted, as emphasised from the start (Shannon & Weaver, 1949). Bits capture nothing of the 
content and qualitative structure of the information conveyed in the transmission. In contrast, 
discriminations from norm include all the particulars of the patterns of input and output for the 
mental process. Furthermore, relationships between response/stimulus functions provide 
evidence on the structure of the information that the environment has afforded to the norm. A 
minimum set of those content-measuring relationships is specified from first principles later in 
this paper, in the sections on types of elemental causal function and interactions among them.  
Each feature’s context of other features 
Contextualized disparities from norm 
Each observed response-stimulus relationship can be scaled in discrimination distances from 
norm. However, for many responses, a situation and its norm are liable to have multiple stimulus 
features. Therefore the scale for any one feature has to be considered from the start in the context 
of other features’ scales from the same norm. This issue can be addressed for the case of only 
one additional feature, because that account can be generalized to any number of contextual 
features.  
The observed data to which one response-stimulus function has been fitted may be 
statistically independent of (uncorrelated with) the data for the function of that response on 
another stimulus. In that case, the two functions are at right angles in a two-dimensional stimulus 
space (e.g., in the plane of the x and z axes), intersecting at the norm point for each stimulus. 
When the observed values of the response at each stimulus are plotted perpendicularly to the 
plane of the two stimuli (i.e., parallel to the y axis), every observed data pair occupies a point on 
the surface of one of two cones, which are set vertex to vertex at the norm point (y = 0).   
Data-pairs with stimulus values on one side of the norm are on a different cone from data-
pairs on the other side. In order to include all data on the surface of one cone, each response-
stimulus line has to be folded at the norm point, i.e. plotted as absolute (unsigned) values of the 
response, either all above the norm response or all below it. The mathematical convention that 
absolute values are expressed as positive would produce a two-stimulus response cone resting on 
its vertex. In science, however, the maximum or the best value is generally plotted at the top of 
the graph. For example, peaked plots of psychophysical functions are commonplace in work on 
learned similarities between stimuli (Hovland, 1937; Shepard, 1958, 1965) and sensory 
preferences (Beebe-Center, 1932). Hence, for present purposes, folded response values are given 
a negative sign for stimulus values above the norm point as well as below it. That gives a cone 
suspended from its vertex.
1
   
1
There is no precise base to the cone of discriminations from norm. The folded linearity should break down when 
Weber’s fraction starts to increase or when responses go too far beyond an anchor on a familiar point away from the 
norm.  Figure X could be cited hereabouts (page 120 of this manuscript). 
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Stimulus values in units of Weber's fraction remain positive above the norm, as well as 
negative below it, since the norm value is zero for each stimulus feature as well as for the 
response. In contrast, the distance along the stimulus plane from the norm for the two stimuli 
(X0, Z0) to a pair of observed values of the stimuli (Xk, Zk) is always on one side of zero, because 
the signed distances are squared in the formula for a point on the surface of the cone in the plane 
of the response value, (Xk
2
 + Zk
2
)
0.5
 in accord with Pythagoras's theorem.  
Both summation along one stimulus axis and also the square root of the sum of the squares 
of the distances along each stimulus axis are arithmetical operations that generalise to three or 
more stimuli. That is because Pythagoras’s theorem applies to the diagonals of a cube, and so on. 
Hence the cone for two stimuli that influence a response generalises for three or more stimuli to 
a ‘hyper-cone’ that cannot be visualised.   
Contextual features that depart from norm 
When the mean of the observed discrimination-scaled stimulus values for one of two stimuli 
is at the norm, the function for the other stimulus will peak on that zero point at the vertex of the 
cone, thus forming an isosceles triangle. However, a session’s mean value for one of the stimuli 
might be some way from the norm. That is a defect in that feature of the context. In such cases, 
the plane of the other peaked function is displaced. Its data fit the edge of a vertical cut through 
the cone at some distance from its vertex (Booth & Freeman, 1993). Hence that function’s peak 
is rounded to a level lower than the norm on the response axis. In other words, even a sample 
having a measured level at the norm is not evaluated overall as being at or very near to the norm. 
This conic section, parallel to the axis for the response, is one branch of a hyperbola, (x
2
 - 
y2)/k = 1 (Figure 1). The asymptotic tangents to the hyperbola intersect at its vertex -- namely, 
the apex of the isosceles triangle through the norm (cp. the straight lines in Figure 1). The (y,x) 
coordinates of the vertex of the hyperbola fitted to a session’s data provide an estimate of the 
mean of the presented values of the contextual stimulus, both in stimulus discrimination units (x 
axis) below or above the norm and in response units (y axis).  
Figure 1 about here 
Samples with moderate contextual defects do not affect the calculations seriously if there are 
adequate numbers of data further from the norm (within the range of constancy in Weber’s 
fraction). The slope and error of the regression line which go into the calculation of the 
discriminative acuity, and of the norm that was used while discriminating, are largely determined 
by the more extreme strengths of the stimulus, as follows from the use of squared deviates.  
The distance of a test stimulus from the learned level was dubbed a generalisation gradient 
by behaviorists (Hovland, 1937; Hull, 1947). The strength of the learned response decreases at 
stimulus levels below and above that of the trained cue. An early proposal for the shape of this 
peak was a hyperbolic function (Pierrel, 1958). The simpler isosceles triangle was widely 
recognized, at least as an approximation (Blough, 1967; Shepard, 1965). A peaked function is 
implicit in any acquired matching process, such in unreinforced familiarisation (Gati & Ben-
Shakhar, 1990) and attitude scaling (Andrich, 1988). 
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The hyperbola to which discrimination-scaled data should be fitted differs from the quadratic 
equation fitted by the traditional folding of preference data (Coombs, 1964). It also differs from 
the orthogonal contrasts used in factorial analysis of variance. The quadratic is the first (after 
linear) in the set of polynomial terms that are an accepted way to summarize the numbers 
collected when there is no specific theory on which to base a substantive measurement. In 
statistical folding, e.g. non-metric multidimensional preference analysis (Carroll, 1972), even the 
direction of the inflection (peak or trough) comes solely from fitting the data, however collected. 
A fully scientific approach fits the observations made in an appropriate design to an equation 
determined by a mechanistic theory, such as discrimination from a contextualised norm.  
The importance of fitting to the hyperbola had an early illustration in an individual whose 
data for each of two features of the object appeared to fit an unfolded quadratic equation with a 
peak far below the norm (Figure 2, upper panel, redrawn from Booth, 1994a, Figure 5.3). This 
person was taking part in an experiment on the effects of levels of sucrose and citric acid on 
liking for a vended drink containing orange flavouring. The apparent contextual defect 
encouraged a guess that the participant was using orange juice as the norm for comparison. The 
real juice has a visual and tactile texture very different from that of the orangey flavoured drink 
with no fruit particles in it. Nevertheless when the data were fitted to the theoretical hyperbola, 
the contextual defect turned out to be rather small (Figure 2, lower panel). Apparently, the 
participant’s familiarity with the vended drink was sufficient to distract the largely taste-driven 
judgments away from the textural divergences from juiced fruit.  
Figure 2 about here 
This mechanism of contextual defects is consistent with the theory of the sharply triangular 
norm-zeroed psychophysical function (Booth et al., 1983), while offering a mathematically exact 
account of observations of rounded peaks (e.g., Shepherd, Farleigh & Land, 1984). 
Learned contextual dependencies 
Invocations of context are often underspecified. That speculative vagueness is removed by 
treating responses as the discrimination of the situation from a learned norm having multiple 
features. The power of this norm, and its limits, are central to the interdependence of ongoing 
perception and long-term memory. Previously acquired constructions that are crucial to effective 
current processing are retrieved into working memory. This does not mean that rehearsal is 
necessary to sustain perception. The executive processes in working memory and perception 
could be entirely subconscious. Indeed, it is likely that implicit conceptual processes are inherent 
to perceptual processes at all levels, neural (e.g., King, Korb & Egner, 2012), linguistic (e.g., 
Wright, 2012) and mental (norm-zeroed discrimination).  
The gist of a communication depends on the context and the observer (Brainerd, Reyna & 
Ceci, 2008). A more precise specification of gist would be an interpretation of the explicit signal 
in terms of the full norm currently developed in memory. Analysis of semantic memory in terms 
of gist exploits ‘fuzzy logic’, which has values between true and false (Brainerd & Ryena, 1990; 
Reyna, 2012). Those undefined intermediate truth values can be replaced by the data-specified 
11 
 
norm-zeroed scale between the perceived absence of a feature and its unequivocal presence at 
varied levels.  
Categorisation of simple visual objects provides highly specific examples of contextual 
features. Rectangles moving together and then apart appear to bounce off each other when there 
is high contrast between the visual objects and the background (Caplovitz, Shapiro & Stroud, 
2011). When the figure-ground contrast is low, one rectangle appears to continue its motion 
across the field (‘streaming’). The contrast can be in luminance or hue (Caplovitz et al., 2011). 
Hence, the rectangular shape is not the controlling feature but rather the contrasts at its edges 
before and after contact. Such effects are theoretically assimilated to feature differences in the 
account of context provided by norm-zeroed discrimination.  
These examples illustrate the importance of quantitative characterisation of the operative 
features, not just specifying the experimental manipulations. This becomes crucial when 
interactions between features are considered: the determinate norm and discrimination scale for 
each feature avoid the loose parameters that plague the modelling of patterns in responses alone 
(see later section on Interactions).   
Ecological validity of context 
Finally, norm-zeroed discrimination scaling of contextual defects provides a quantitative 
basis for judging the ecological validity of an experiment as representative of real life (Brunswik, 
1955, 1956). The degree of invalidity can be measured in units of the scoring of a response or in 
number of Weber fractions on an observed or integrated stimulus dimension. Large contextual 
defects are liable to be underestimated because some features were sampled outside the range of 
constancy of Weber’s fraction. 
The basics of psychological measurement 
Psychological versus social and material quantities 
Independence of psychological measurement 
The measurement of a mental process should not be forced into a model of physical 
measurement, nor abandoned to arbitrary fiat or tradition about the use of numbers. When 
combined with subjectivism about the mind, such approaches have led some to the conclusion 
that measurement is impossible in psychology. Strengths of a sensation or other private 
experience cannot be concatenated observably, as physical lengths or masses can be. There can 
be no socially agreed standard of a subjective magnitude, unlike a unit of currency or the date of 
a public holiday. Mere instructions to respond in ratios of a number assigned to an initial sample 
may or may not put experienced intensities onto an equal-ratio scale.  
Psychological measurement is entirely distinct from both physical and social measurement.  
Its fundamental validity is assured by conjoint design with analysis by double cancellation (Luce 
& Tukey, 1964). However, such resort to abstract first principles demands amounts of data that 
are prohibitively large for most investigations of substantive issues. Also, fundamental 
measurement on multiple dimensions risks ecologically implausible combinations of extremes.  
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The linearity of an individual’s responding on a self-provided category can be assured by 
much simpler procedures than conjoint cancellation (Shapiro, 1961). That technique of personal 
scaling can be extended to several self-generated levels on an effectively linear psychological 
scale (Singh & Bilsbury, 1989a,b). However, those approaches are limited to measurement of a 
single construct at a time. They are also much more laborious than quantitative judgments. 
Norm-zeroed discrimination provides a theoretical foundation for designs that yield an 
unusually high ratio of complexity and precision of interpretation to number of raw data. In 
psychology as in the natural and social sciences, sound and practical measurement requires 
empirically concrete theory, not just abstract theorems.   
The ordinary skill of quantitative judgment  
Remarkably little attention has been given to the strategy of trusting participants to judge 
quantities validly. There seems to be an underlying presumption that people generally are 
capable only of selecting among a few boxes with a short phrase against each. Even worse, the 
responses are assumed to measure what the investigators think is meant by the words they 
provided. There is no examination of the constructs that the raters used, as is routine for the 
specificity of any physical measurement procedure. Equally erroneously, the ranks of the verbal 
categories are treated as normally distributed quantities, instead of putting the incidences of ticks 
on each box into frequency statistics as competent survey analysts do.  
These fallacies are perpetuated by calling a response line an analogue, or a numerical score 
the estimate of a subjective magnitude. Mistakes of that sort are not avoided by merely naming a 
layout after a previous investigator such as Likert or with a widely used but erroneous label such 
as VAS (‘visual analogue scale’). Investigators are reduced to the ridiculous procedure of using a 
ruler to measure the distance of each response along the line from an end anchor. The multiple 
anchored ‘scales’ seldom bear any relation to the original two or three grades of extreme or 
moderate agreement or disagreement with a single statement of attitude in the layout used by 
Likert (1932), for the totally different purpose of obtaining scores for use in multi-item 
psychometric scaling. These errors have even been combined, by placing ordered categories on a 
line at positions spaced according to numerical ratings that were collected under different 
conditions and averaged across groups regardless of differences between individuals. 
In contrast, the evidence is that the ability to make quantitative use of single-digit integers 
higher than three can be acquired in early childhood within any human culture (Cantlon, Safford 
& Brannon, 2010; Dahaene, Izard, Spelke & Pica, 2008; Nunez, 2011). Most quantitative 
judgments make no more than about five or seven discriminations (Conner, Haddon, Pickering & 
Booth, 1988c; cp. Miller, 1956) because of the memory load required (Baddeley, 1994). This 
skill of judging quantities that are public, such as distance, duration, weight and concentration, 
can readily be extended to private quantities such as the extent of a pain or a joy, particularly 
when raters’ own words are used to express their phenomenology (e.g. Booth, O’Leary et al., 
2011; Bowman, Booth, Platts et al., 2004; Conner, Haddon & Booth, under review; Freeman and 
Booth, under review).   
13 
 
Hence there are good grounds for expecting any set of appropriately elicited quantitative 
responses to arise from a linear response-stimulus function. The consequences of treating each 
individual’s performance as linear in this way are then open to empirical examination in each 
type of investigation. Ideally, linear competence should be checked in each individual in each 
session. Norm-zeroed discrimination in principle offers such routine checks. 
The above considerations point to a single type of layout for responses to be analysed as 
quantitative judgments. The participant is asked to place each test stimulus at a position on a line, 
or in a row of single-digit integers, with just two positions anchored verbally or pictorially. This 
procedure frees the ratings from the complicated instructions and biased selections of stimuli that 
have become traditional because of investigators’ misconceptions of ‘scaling’. If the generated 
judgments have a straight-line relationship to the presented quantities (or to a simple 
transformation of them), there is no need for mathematical justification of the claim to have 
measured some psychological process that transforms stimulus quantities into response 
quantities. A complete explanation of the linearity is provided by that theory that responses are at 
discrimination-scaled distances from the personal norm for the tested situation, as follows. 
The universal layout for quantitative judgments  
Judgments of the stimulus  
Whether expressed numerically or graphically, judgments are perceptual achievements. They 
estimate the objective magnitudes in the environment, not subjective states of sensation, emotion 
or desire. If the observed positions on lines or in the number series are analogues of anything, it 
is objective distance, but in a sense that encompasses either physical kilometres or social 
closeness of kinship.  
The linear array 
The theory of personal cognition relies on the repeatedly tested working principle that 
quantitative judgments place test stimuli at distances from the norm. This psychological scale has 
the norm at zero and both interval and ratio properties over the range of constancy of the Weber 
fraction. It follows that quantitative judgments should be elicited as responses placed on a linear 
array, whether graphic or numerical.   
The response can be a position on a continuous or broken line, a row of boxes, or some or all 
of the series of single-digit integers from zero. Score out of ten (with a zero) is routine for the 
many viewers of talent shows. These eleven (unlabeled) digits are amply sufficient; just 0 to 4, 
i.e. quarters of a whole, serve for many purposes (Friedman & Friedman, 1986). For those who 
regularly think in percentages, 0 to 100 can be used as a numerical response (Booth, Mather & 
Fuller, 1982), or the eleven 10% points (and maybe 5%s as well) in a graphic array for a 
positional response.    
Just two anchors 
Two points are logically necessary and sufficient to specify a straight line. Three anchors 
carry the risk of generating two different slopes, i.e. unequal discrimination distances between 
the middle anchor and either outer anchor. Multiple anchors have long been known to have 
uneven spacing between adjacent pairs (e.g., Jones, Peryam & Thurstone, 1955) and yet they 
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remain widely used, despite the simplicity of two anchors, and the assured linearity of the 
response/stimulus function.  
The two labelled response positions should evoke familiar quantitative categories of a single 
qualitative category of feature. The most objective anchor, and the one that allows the most 
precise judgments, references the most familiar level of the category in the culture generally. If 
the quantity is in private experience, then the most extreme amount imaginable may be the safest 
higher anchor. Where absence of the feature is familiar, a level judged as zero can be used as the 
lower anchor. Such an anchor is needed when raters might believe that the feature is absent at a 
low level of the stimulus; the investigator can then avoid the floor effects liable to be produced 
by testing samples near the lower limit of recognition.   
Rows of boxes with most familiar or preferred level as a mid-anchor, and unrecognisable or 
unacceptable as the lower anchor, have routinely performed linearly against discrimination-
scaled distances (Booth et al., 1983; Booth, Earl & Mobini, 2003; Conner et al., 1986a, 
1988a,b,c). A row of the eight integers from zero to seven for judgments of the current level of 
an adverse state, as verbalised by sufferers themselves, has given linear and normal data in many 
studies in different countries (e.g., for chronic fatigue in rheumatic disease, Bowman, 2008; 
Bowman, Booth, Platts et al., 2003, 2004; Bowman, Hamburger, Richards et al., 2009;  
Goodchild, Treharne, Booth et al., 2008; Segal, Thomas, Rogers et al., 2008; Seror, Ravaud, 
Mariette et al., 2011; Strombeck, Theander & Jacobsson, 2006).   
When one of the two anchored response points is scored as zero (whether or not numerical 
responses are used), the observed ratings can be taken to have full psychological measurement 
properties (in ratios as well as intervals) until there is evidence to the contrary, such as consistent 
failure of norm-zeroed discrimination analysis.  
Linearity of performance 
The key to investigating personal cognition is to provide the opportunity to respond linearly 
to conjunctions of salient stimuli. Linearity of the response/stimulus function can be assumed if 
procedures have been implemented that keep stimulus levels within the range of constancy of 
Weber’s fraction and avoid distortions in the response measures.  
Furthermore, this working principle can be tested against plausible alternative hypotheses on 
the collected data. The first stage of testing among hypothesised causal processes can compare 
equal interval (untransformed) with equal ratio (logarithmic) stimulus levels for fit to levels of 
each response. That is, linear and semi-logarithmic functions can be tested against each other 
routinely. It should be noted that these tests are done on individuals’ data from single sessions, 
not on grouped data, and that the choice of the two functions is theoretically based, unlike a 
polynomial for example (Nihm, 1976).  
Normalcy of performance  
Both least-squares regression and the calculation of Weber’s fraction presuppose that the 
probabilities of responses are normally distributed, and indeed have the same dispersion at each 
stimulus level (Figure 2). As Thurstone (1927b) pointed out, this assumption can be checked 
empirically. In the first experiments using this approach, which minimised known biases on 
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quantitative judgments, responses above and below the norm anchor had indistinguishable 
standard deviations (Conner & Booth, 1992).  
When responses are near-normal, least squares regression is remarkably resilient in practice 
to the square distributions of stimulus levels that are desirable to minimise biases (see the section 
below on the design of a session). Indeed, just two levels of a stimulus can be used, without 
resort to logistic regression. The same assumptions about stimulus distributions are made in n-
way factorial analysis of variance as a special case of multiple regression. Nonetheless, 
quantitative sources of input are to be preferred whenever available, because they provide greater 
precision and realism.  
Weber’s fraction from an individual’s session 
The unit of measurement in personal cognition 
A response’s differential acuity to a stimulus provides the generic unit of measurement of 
causal strength by norm-zeroed discrimination scaling. The individual participant’s Weber 
fraction for each measured stimulus feature is determined for a response in each set of tests 
within an experimental session or period of observations. The calculation divides the slope of the 
line into the root mean square error of the least squares regression from stimulus values to 
response values (Torgerson, 1958).  
Each test sample’s distance from the norm on each response-stimulus function is calculated 
as a number of Weber fractions. These distances are arithmetically determinate from the data-
pairs entered into the regression. The least squares fitting to the data is used as an estimator, not a 
statistical evaluation.  
The half-discriminated disparity 
Weber’s fraction is often said to be based on an arbitrary choice of percent correct - for 
example, 75% rather than, say, 60% in tasks where 50% is random and 100% is always correct. 
That view is ill considered. The relevant fractional increase in level of the stimulus is halfway 
between complete success and complete failure at discriminating. The two stimulus levels that 
are half-discriminated have response probability distributions that superimpose the upper quartile 
of responses to the lower stimulus on the lower quartile from the higher stimulus (Figure 3). The 
(infinite) areas under the two curves are half overlapping (Booth & Freeman, 1993; Conner et 
al., 1988c).  
Figure 3 about here 
Each word in the term ‘half-discriminated disparity’ (hdd) is carefully chosen to replace the 
longstanding ‘just-noticeable difference’ (jnd). Discriminating is performance, whereas noticing 
is phenomenology. What counts as ‘just’ on the edge between noticeable and not noticeable is 
totally subjective and indeed arguably paradoxical: how could one judge if something is not 
noticeable? Furthermore, the data could only be about what is noticed in the test as run; what the 
participant is ‘able’ to notice is a further question. Weber’s fraction is used in personal cognition 
to measure what has actually been discriminated during the individual’s session, not what 
supposedly can be discriminated at best in any situation (let alone at every level of the stimulus). 
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The ‘difference’ in the term jnd is also phenomenological -- a difference in intensity between 
two sensations. The performance of discrimination between levels of the stimulus is on ratios of 
physical measurements of sensed material characteristics, or between differences (intervals) in 
level of symbolized cultural attributes (e.g., verbalized concepts), as shown above. The term 
‘disparity’ spans ratios and differences.  
Weber’s fraction, or the hdd (jnd) ratio, is dimensionless in the sense of that term in 
mathematical physics, because the stimulus units have cancelled out. Nonetheless, the 
discriminated levels of the stimulus are measured in a particular unit. Furthermore, the fraction 
or ratio is specific to the response and to the context that affords the norm. Hence the degree of 
discriminative acuity is relevant only for the individual and situation in which it has been 
estimated.  
Point of equality to the norm 
The calculation of Weber’s fraction also provides an estimate of the objective point of 
equality to the standard used in the quantitative judgments on the presented levels of the stimulus 
(Torgerson, 1958). Again, this equality is a parameter value of performance, not a matter of 
phenomenology: the traditional term, ‘point of subjective equality’ is a misnomer. The subjective 
interpretation of this matching level presupposes that the varied and constant stimuli evoke 
conscious states of intensities of sensation. Yet the task may not evoke any private experiences 
of that sort. Also, the standard used is personal to each participant, not necessarily the level of 
any constant stimulus provided by the experimenter. Yet this individuality is a public 
achievement, whether or not it is also privately experienced in some manner.  
Hence the response-stimulus function for an individual’s session gives the amount of each 
varied stimulus that the participant assigned to the norm anchor category, if that was explicit on 
the layout for responding, or to whatever norm was implicit in the participant’s physical or 
symbolic responses during the session. This matching point is the stimulus level at the centre 
[(0,0) point] of the hyperbola that best fits the data. The calculation of the point of equality to the 
norm is not separate from that of the half discriminated disparity. 
The stimulus level of the norm is sometimes used as a measure of sensitivity. Individuals 
with peak responses at lower levels are regarded as more sensitive to the stimulus. However this 
conception of sensitivity has a different mathematics from both differential sensitivity (Weber’s 
fraction) and detection sensitivity (d’), because each of the three is a distinct acquired skill.  It 
would be surprising if extreme insensitivities of detection or discrimination did not go with high 
norm points (e.g. Booth, Sharpe & Conner, 2011b). Yet in principle the insensitivity might only 
produce a greater scatter of norms. The actual pattern depends on pathways of development 
through the options in the environment that have been left open by the genome at each stage of 
genetic expression and cultural inculcation. Conversely, extreme sensitivity is likely to lead to a 
low norm but the individual might cope with the cultural average in some other way, acquiring a 
more usual norm.  
For example, great sensitivity to bitterness might induce a lifelong dislike of coffee or 
mature cheeses. Yet early lack of options could lead to a liking for coffee if weak or for cheese if 
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mild. A third possibility is that regular coffee or cheese becomes greatly liked in early adulthood 
because of its exciting taste. Effective investigation of such developmental channelling depends 
on measuring discrimination and norm before and after each step in development in the 
individual (not in a cross-sectional design). 
Other measures of differential sensitivity or causal strength 
The calculation of Weber’s fraction combines the slope of the regression line with its error, 
i.e. the variance in the deviates from the line (Figure 3). Yet measures of the sensitivity of a 
response or the strength of influence of a stimulus have often been limited to either slopes or 
variances, even in psychology, let alone in other basic or applied sciences.   
Slope  
To measure sensitivity, natural scientists and engineers have usually deployed slopes, such 
as calibration lines, dose-response functions, and percent of perfect functioning. This reflects 
their confidence that their experiments are good simulations of the causation in nature or in the 
physical machinery.  
In contrast, experimental psychologists betray doubts that they can understand the 
mechanisms involved. They often opt only to compare a single experimental condition with a 
control condition, or to test between mere binary opposites (Newell, 1973; Shepard, 2004). As 
inevitable for systems of causation, such lines of experiment run into complexities. Then 
contexts have to be better specified. Factorial designs might be tried. This gives a chance for a 
task-specific slope to emerge. The field of visual search provides a good example (Wolfe 1994).  
Indeed, experimental psychology is more qualitative than often recognized. Analysis of 
variance (unless factorial) reduces all independent variables to categories. Typically two distinct 
categories of condition are used as experimental and control; this precludes measurement of the 
independent variable. The favourite response -- reaction time (RT) -- is merely a categorical 
Yes/No. Ignoring RT errors (or minimising them) throws away the opportunity to gather 
evidence on structure in the processing from stimulus to response. Reaction times are 
reassuringly numerical and appear to be free from supposed vagaries of words. That however is 
an illusion, fostered by the refusal to listen to what subjects say. Key presses communicate “Yes” 
or “No” by a conceptual criterion requested in the instructions. The analysis of errors can be 
illuminating but is greatly bettered by diagnoses from ratings of an overall degree of match or of 
specific concepts. That is sufficient to identify a response construct that can be related to any 
hypothesised causal factor in the context. 
Variance around the line 
To assess causal power, social scientists on the other hand have favoured the regression 
coefficient (r), i.e. the complement of error variance (1 – r
2
). However, the collecting of data is 
often not designed to test among causal hypotheses appropriate to the context. It can be 
prohibitively costly to collect population-representative data, whether in the aggregate or 
individual by individual. The mining of archival or survey data is necessary. Therefore model-
testing modes of multivariate analysis are especially important (Pearl, 2000). Yet these analyses 
specify only sizes of effect such as the partial regression coefficient. Parameter values are often 
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not considered at all. Hence, even if causation is established, the model is non-predictive because 
initial conditions are unknown and so their transformations are indeterminate.  
Discrimination requires both slope and variance  
Neither slope nor (lack of) error is satisfactory on its own. The value of the slope carries no 
estimate of the reliability of that value (unless confidence limits are also stated). The regression 
coefficient, or its square (the variance accounted for), provides only the statistical effect size, 
with no measure in observation units of the actual size of the effect of the influence on the 
consequence.  
A measure that relates solely to variance, without reference to slope, is sometimes called a 
jnd -- for example, in measuring the social response to the physics of a picture (ITU-R, 2012). 
Other variants include judgments’ root mean square error itself, the proportion of experts who 
judge a difference in the wrong direction, or a function with finite tails, in order to cope with big 
disparities (Keelan & Urabe, 2004). These are objective measures of variation in the judgments 
on the material stimulus affordances of pixel arrays, e.g. luma and chroma (Lubin, 1997; Yang, 
Chen, Tian & Wu, 2012). Nevertheless, individuals’ context-specific Weber fractions would 
improve the speed and accuracy of measurements (for color vision deficiency, see Flatia & 
Gutwin, 2011). Psychology could have given a lead a century before the pixel was invented. 
In short, the slope component of Weber’s fraction cannot be replaced. The data points on the 
slope capture the content of information, rather than just its amount. The slope is in terms of 
measurement values of the source and sink, information which is lost in the slope’s error or the 
explained variance. The norm reveals the structure used to extract content from the stimulus in 
terms of the response. The peaked response-stimulus function by itself can show how close the 
context investigated is to the most familiar situation, while error in the data remains a mystery.  
Determinate processing under environmental constraints  
Uncertainty in a feature’s value 
Norm-zeroed discrimination scaling provides determinate axioms and algorithms. However 
some decisions are made in situations of explicit uncertainty. Heuristics then come into play, as 
proposed by prospect theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1974). These decision-making principles 
deal with levels of stimulus and response affordances that are unknown to a major extent. The 
heuristics are far from sufficient to account for the dynamic structure of mental states, either in 
general or for concrete examples. The exact calculations of personal cognition are therefore 
needed as a base, with heuristics for handling uncertainty to be activated when needed.   
Prospect heuristics provide accounts of dependence of decisions on sequence or time-lagged 
effects of context, although there are difficulties with some specifics. Principles from quantum 
physics have been claimed to help (Pothos & Busemeyer, 2013). However, it seems unlikely in 
principle that non-classical indeterminacy will do better because of the problems arising from 
lack of specific content in the heuristics. In personal cognition, sequence effects can be related 
determinately to changes in salience of features (see below), similarly to integrated weightings 
(Birnbaum & Gutierrez, 2007).   
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Contextual limits on processing each feature 
Number of features being processed. More fundamental than external uncertainties are 
internal limits on the number of features that can be implicitly measured in one test sample. How 
many of the monitored features an individual actually used in a session is estimated from their 
strength of influence on the response of interest, i.e. the features’ saliences measured as their 
differential acuities over the session. Both the number of features and the number of levels 
distinguished are limited by the capacity of the interaction between perception and retrieval of 
the norm from memory (Baddeley, 1994). There may be corollaries for the time taken to decide. 
Sequence of processing. On the present theory, the determinants of an intention or 
involuntary reaction start with implicit comparisons of features of the situation with features in a 
norm acquired on previous occasions. The norm categorises affordances of the social and 
material environment and contrasts the environmental levels with the norm’s levels. This basic 
process is independent the sequence of processing salient features or the durations of attention to 
each feature. The situation (including compliance with an experiment) may impose a sequence of 
explicit processing of selected features (as in sensory profiling) and/or some time constraints on 
completion of the action (as in reaction times). As with uncertainties, sequencing and speeding 
superimpose heuristics on the underlying norm-zeroed discrimination scaling.    
Strength of influence of a feature 
Relative power of an affordance 
The salience of a feature, and the current attention paid to it, is the relative strength of 
influence that the feature has on the response to be explained. This active causal power of 
information in an input or output affordance is measured as the proportion of the variance in the 
response explained by the feature.    
As with any analysis within an individual, this measure of salience applies only to those test 
samples during the session that were treated in the same way. In the theory of norm-zeroed 
discrimination, this means that the samples were compared with the same norm. The closer that 
one of the hypotheses based on multiple discriminations comes to accounting for all the variance 
in the response throughout the session, the more consistent must have been the processing across 
the tested variants of the situation.  
Nevertheless, the estimated salience of a feature is an average of degrees of salience that 
may have varied among the tested samples. Attention may shift to or from a feature between 
samples. An intentional shift in attention may arise from a change in thinking. An effortless shift 
may come from an extraneous event. An important case is a change in salience induced by a 
previous sample. Norm-zeroed discrimination theory provides a fully specified version of this 
type of explanation of effects of sequence on decision making.   
Intransitivity of choices 
Much attention in decision theory has been paid to inconsistency of choices between the 
different pairs of three situations. The choices considered have generally been gambles (Tversky, 
1969, but see Birnbaum & Gutierrez, 2007). Far less work has been done on decisions among 
currently present situations or items. Missing attributes have been invoked but this is unlikely in 
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choices among real situations or for competing items within a situation. Incomplete scanning of 
attributes seems more likely, and has been proposed to occur at random (Kriesler & Nitzan, 
2008) 
 For decisions among probabilistic prospects, a powerful approach to explaining 
intransitivity and other paradoxes of choice invokes the setting of a reference value for each 
feature (Kahneman & Tversky, 1974). The learnt norm is a version of such an approach that is 
fully constrained by the data. Instead of comparison with reference prospects, the present 
approach compares the relative closeness of the presented levels of different common features to 
their ideal values. Varying salience could generate a similar explanation of intransitivity. 
The simplest example is a sequence of observations that A > B, B > C and C > A, where > 
means preferred to, in the sense of chosen over. These data can be explained if A and B have a 
(salient) common feature on which the first choice was made, whereas B shares a different 
feature with C on which the second choice was made. The paradoxical third choice could arise if 
the levels of the feature in common between A and B were both further from its norm point than 
the B-C commonality was from its norm. Then, overall, C could be closer to the norm than A.  
A sequence-dependent intransitivity (e.g., Anderson & Matessa, 1997; Altmann, 2000; 
Luchins, 1957) could be generated by salience alone, even when the three items had all features 
in common. In the above situation, for example, if A and B both had features relatively far from 
norm, that extreme might draw greater attention subsequently to features with levels close to the 
norm, determining the choice between B and C. The increased salience of features close to the 
norm could reverse the status of A relative to C (and to B, if A versus B were re-tested).  
Identification of a causal process 
Correlation proves causation  
Great confusion has arisen from statements that correlation does not show causation.  On the 
contrary, the repeated observation of a reliable correlation of quantities (or association of 
categories) is proof that causation exists. What is unknown from such evidence by itself is the 
direction(s) of that causation. On the basis of the correlation alone, either or both of the two 
variables could be a cause or an effect. If neither variable can be shown to be an influence on the 
other, a third variable is causing them each to co-vary with the other.   
Failure to identify the direction of causation is not a flaw of the correlation statistic either.  
Analysis of variance does not in itself establish direction of causation, any more than regression 
from one variable to another turns the predictor into an influence on the criterion. ANOVA is 
merely (multiple) regression with categories or group-wide fixed levels serving as predictors. 
What usually turns the predictor(s) in an ANOVA into independent variables is experimental 
manipulation of the categories to be statistically independent of each other, or to be uncorrelated 
ways in factorial ANOVA. The question is how those orthogonal relationships in the data are 
achieved. The answer rests in the relationship between data and theory. 
The philosopher David Hume (1748/1902) argued that constant concomitance gives an 
illusion of causation. That can be psychologically true: if two events are seen in close proximity 
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in time and space, there can be a powerful impression that the first event caused the second event 
(Michotte, 1963), whereas in fact the experimenter caused both events. However, this paper is 
not about an individual’s perception of causality. The issue here is what evidence society has for 
the existence of a causal process within an individual’s mind.   
The implication often taken -- that the inference of causation from correlation is fallacious -- 
is itself built on the fallacy that knowledge can be built from bare observations (or worse, from 
private impressions). Rather, empirical knowledge is built by testing relevant observations for 
consistency with a hypothesis derived from a theory that explains existing observations within its 
scope and implies observations that have yet to be made (Lakatos & Musgrave, 1970; Popper, 
1963). If a theory predicts that event V causes event W, there is strong evidence against that 
hypothesis if each event recurs on its own but V and W have yet to be observed to occur 
together.  
Evidence for a particular causal process  
Delay between cause and effect 
In other words, the issue of causation does not arise unless the two theoretically relevant 
events occur together more often than coincidences predicted from their separate probabilities. 
The logically very first step is therefore to gather evidence whether or not the two events occur 
together in the context required by a substantive hypothesis from a well developed empirical 
theory. Then, however, there remains a problem of testing if one of the events is causal and the 
other an effect of it. A solution requires further reference to the theory.  
Usually in psychology, a small delay is expected between the start of a causative event and 
the start of its effect(s). It takes a finite time to transform incoming information into outgoing 
information, even without any intermediate processes. Hence the evidence for concurrence of the 
event needs to be sensitive to time-lags between starts of events, within the theoretical duration 
of action of such a cause on such effect. The putative cause starting before the effect is consistent 
with the hypothesis. Concomitance with a time lag only the other way round is evidence against 
the hypothesis and consistent with causation in the reverse direction. Time lags both ways are 
consistent with causal processes in each direction. 
Experiments that apply a stimulus and record an effect may not need to measure the latency 
between starts. When timing is measured, as in reaction time experiments, the delay is evident 
and the inference of causal direction is trivial. The problems come with attempting to use 
response latencies alone to identify the nature of the transformation from stimulus to response 
(e.g., Mordkoff & Miller, 1993). Error rates under different conditions provide some evidence, 
but such data are usually unsystematic.  
These difficulties in interpreting reaction times arise because adequate data on the structure 
of the transformation are not available, or not even sought. Many simple-looking experimental 
designs, such as the controlled clinical trial, have the same defect. The observations do not focus 
on what is happening from the start to the end of the period during which the experiment’s 
intervention is actively causing effects. Typically the hypothesized outcome is measured much 
later. Continued direct influence by the intervention may not be monitored either. Tracking 
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potentially mediating processes is crucial to understanding how the intervention worked, 
especially when psychological processes are involved. For example, antidepressants of different 
sorts have been found to act via side-effects that patients are informed about or are mimicked by 
placebos that act on the autonomic nervous system (Greenberg, Bornstein, Zborowski et al., 
1994; Mora, Nestoriuc & Rief, 2011; Thompson, 1982). In short, the vaunted randomised 
controlled trial makes so many naive assumptions that it amounts to nothing more than a weak 
observational design using cohorts. 
These problems are worse still in multivariate research, even with time-lagged analysis. 
Structural models seldom specify states within the minds tested. Psychological variables are 
typically limited to individuals’ positions on broad and stable consensus variables. Mediating 
processes need to be tracked in each individual. Attempts to generalize should be left until the 
causal processes within a relevant set of minds have been characterised.    
An individual’s single session 
Causal interpretation of each successive pair of data 
The principle of discrimination between a situation and a norm generates a determinate 
interpretative procedure, with or without experimental manipulation of the occurrence of the 
hypothesized cause. Observations can be evaluated one by one as they come in. An initial 
misinterpretation can be corrected by the next observation or two.  
If there is not already a causal hypothesis for the two categories of event in the context, the 
first observation has to become support for the hypothesis, in order to treat each subsequent 
datum seriously. For the purposes of illustration, the initially observed pair of data will be taken 
to be positive concomitance, i.e. co-occurrence of the two events in the top right cell (1,1) of the 
2 x 2 association table of Figure 4. The logic used below applies equally to an initial observation 
(data-point 1) in any of the other three quadrants of Figure 4. The events could be re-coded into 
the cell (1,1), even if one or each of them is in fact the non-occurrence of that particular event. 
Figure 4 about here 
The logical possibilities for the second and indeed each subsequent observation are a pair of 
events in any one of the four quadrants of each panel in the first row of Figure 4. Recurrence of 
an observation in the upper right quadrant supports the hypothesis (Figure 4, second row). An 
observation in the lower left quadrant is also compatible with the hypothesis. However, an 
observation in either of the other two quadrants is contrary to the hypothesis.  
Each of the two observations consistent with the hypothesis has the possibility of a third 
hypothesis-consistent observation of 0.5, reducing the probability that the hypothesis is false to 
0.25 (Figure 4, third row). The same logic applies to each successive observation. Hence six 
observations without the pair of events appearing in either the upper left or lower right quadrants 
has an a priori probability of  0.03125 (0.5
6
), better than the conventional threshold of reliability, 
p < 0.05. That is, a mere six observations of only upper right or lower left pairs have a 
probability of about 3%. Two more such data-pairs reach better than p < 0.01. A pilot study with 
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five observations can approach conventional statistical significance, at p = 0.0625, providing 
some justification for full-scale investigation.  
It may be possible to select conditions, or to manipulate the situation, so that one of the 
relevant events always occurs, i.e. limit the observations to the upper or right-hand two quadrants 
in Figure 4. The probabilities of the other event co-occurring remain the same.  
Quantitative concomitance    
Paradoxical edge of absence 
Such tests for constant concomitance are logically sound but the categories of present and 
absent are over-restrictive. Indeed the notion of a borderline between presence and absence is a 
source of fundamental confusion about perception. In both fundamental and applied sciences, 
absolute thresholds are often treated as the be-all and end-all of sensory measurement. The 
practical issues alone make the persistence in this approach very strange. The usual procedures 
for determining a supposed threshold for apparent presence of a stimulus are laborious. The 
numbers obtained are highly variable. The logical flaw in recognition of absence is fatal. Yet 
these values for the putative presence-absence borderline are used to measure the causal 
strengths of types of stimulus at levels far above detection. For example, various forms of the 
‘odour number’ remain popular in research on flavours, fragrances and taints (ASTM, 2012): 
this is in effect the reciprocal of a value for the ‘absolute threshold’ for a volatile compound. Yet, 
when tested, measures of detection and discrimination correlate poorly (Mojet, Christ-Hazelhof 
& Heidema, 2005). Another example is the common practice of using measures of sensitivity to 
the presence of a stimulus to estimate the strengths of effect of readily detected levels on 
preferences (e.g., Harwood, Ziegler & Hayes, 2012; Lucas, Riddell, Liem et al., 2011), despite 
the long known lack of correlation (Pangborn & Pecore, 1982). How much influence a sensed 
material characteristic has on choice is an issue of discrimination from norm, regardless of 
detection limit.   
In contrast, the usual issue is not whether a feature is present or absent but how much of it is 
present, relative to the level that is expected. Detection can be important but for acting in 
emergencies, not for dealing with ordinary situations.  
Judging quantities 
The above consideration of categorical evidence for causation can be converted to a 
quantitative treatment by replacing presence and absence by higher (H) or lower (L) ranges of 
levels of graded features (Table 1). The dummy coding of cells can still be 1 or 0 but 1 means 
high (not merely present), and 0 means low(er). The low range does not exclude absence but 
should not be so low as to be beyond the range of Weber fraction constancy or where the slope 
of the psychophysical function declines below semi-logarithmic (Laming, 1986). 
Table 1 and Figure 5 about here 
Furthermore, a categorical or ordinal feature can be rescaled as a quantity, whether of an 
effect such as a response by the individual or of an influence such as a stimulus feature. The 
higher and lower levels can each sample their own range of values, for example producing an 
evenly spaced set of amounts of the putative influence. This design provides data amenable to 
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linear regression, even with only three observations (Table 1). The slope of the regression from 
100% or 0% of the influence or any set intermediate values provides an estimator of the strength 
of the causation that produces the observed regression coefficient. 
The testing can be more sensitive with a different quantitative stimulus level in each sample. 
A reliable pattern may be seen even with points in the crossed quadrants. From linear regression 
through six cases, an r-value of 0.71 or more has the conventional p < 0.05. Even with only four 
cases, r = 0.82 reaches p < 0.05. 
Finally, if the data are monotonic from below the norm to above, they need to be folded in 
order to calculate the interactions between different output/input functions. In consequence, 
designs that test only two stimulus levels need to place them both on the same side of the norm; 
otherwise, the folding point is indeterminate. That is, the data must resolve a norm value that lay 
between the two levels of the stimulus from a norm that was far beyond one of the levels.  
Selected observations or experimental manipulation? 
The present approach works for either experimental or observational designs, and a range of 
combinations and extensions such as quasi-experimental and self-observational studies. Indeed, 
there is no fundamental divide between experimental and non-experimental tests of hypotheses. 
Each extreme ultimately needs the same intensive investigation for hidden mediators and 
moderators. The critical requirement is that the observations are confined to a context in which 
the theory specifies that the causal process could be occurring. Mining arbitrarily collected sets 
of data, looking for inspiration of some hypothesis, turns this logic on its head and is liable to be 
seriously misleading through neglect of crucial contextual factors.  
When the data have not been generated within an ecologically valid experiment, data pairs 
have to be selected to fit the relevant experimental design. The usual manipulation of stimuli in 
psychological experiments is in fact the selection among affordances, if the hypothesized 
independent variable is to have any effect on the observed response. A vital issue is what such 
manipulation has done to the context, but that is seldom checked. Norm-zeroed discrimination 
analysis screens for such artifacts by measuring contextual defects. 
A context has to been found or created where the each of the two events can occur or not 
occur. Then no observation of either occurrence is omitted from analysis of the data.  For 
example, if a medical trial is to be valid, once the criteria for inclusion and exclusion of patients 
have been applied, all patients are entered randomly into the experimental or control conditions 
and the measurements of outcomes (‘intention to treat’ design).   
Ill considered manipulation or selection of samples on a variable can create artificiality that 
distorts the situation and stresses the system. It is better to monitor known likely confounding 
variables and to re-test the same hypothesis in a situation having other sorts of potential 
confounders. At the very least, serious departures from norm should be identified and rectified in 
subsequent experiments.  
A norm and its environmental affordances, both stimuli and responses, are always affected to 
some extent by any investigation. At the very least, the observed values have to have been 
recorded. Many observational designs greatly constrain the response affordances by asking 
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questions in a particular way. This can range from an interview that is structured in accord with 
the investigator’s preconceptions, to ratings that impose verbal or pictorial anchor categories and 
positional or numeric formats in accord with a research tradition rather than the requirements of 
measuring specified causation. 
These considerations cast in question the claim that the direction of causation inferred from 
time-lagged observations can be validated by experiment (Pearl, 2000). The experimenter’s 
intervention alters the situation. These threats to valid inference can be minimized by use of 
observations to study what theory based on experiment implies are unmediated effects of the 
cause on the effect. Those observations need to be confined to the period when the mechanism is 
active, i.e. the causal event is occurring. Also there should be time lags between observations 
that match the duration over which the hypothesized mechanism becomes active.  
Minimum biases 
To sustain the opportunity to respond linearly, major distortions of performance need to be 
avoided. This can be done by designing response formats and sets of test stimuli so that 
successive samples in an individual’s session can be selected to avoid known sources of 
nonlinearity and to keep each feature of the samples within the range of a constant Weber 
fraction. That discipline also helps to keep the session’s simulated situation the same from the 
individual participant’s point of view, i.e. close to her or his own acquired norms for percepts 
and intents. 
The most important threat to linearity is an end effect. Typically this results from a ceiling or 
floor created by a limit on the options for responding. Presentation of a stimulus level outside 
that limit forces performance off a straight line relationship between response and stimulus.    
Test stimuli having strengths at the higher end of a range tend to lower the average value of 
the responses (Parducci, 1965).  Hence, in the presence of that range bias, a stronger stimulus is 
needed to match the assessor’s personal standard, such as the most preferred or familiar level.  
A wide variety of distortions from linearity can be characterized in terms of mismatches 
between response format levels and the distribution of stimulus levels (Poulton, 1979, 1989).  
Besides range and frequency biases, there is also a centering bias (Poulton, 1989). This can be 
minimized by presenting the first test variant of the situation with each of its features at close to 
the familiar level. If any feature in that first variant is assessed as being at the personal norm, it 
can be presented in the second variant at a level readily discriminated from norm. Interpretation 
of the data obtained so far can be refined as each new datum comes in, so that range bias and end 
effects, and finally frequency bias, can all be minimized for each participant during the first 
session of testing a situation (Conner et al., 1988c). 
A quite different flaw in design is miscommunication of the concept on which the 
quantitative judgment is made. One of the commonest distortions imposed on participants is the 
provision of multiple or even mixed categories. The categorical terms on the anchors must be 
identical, and also the same as in any question asked alongside the layout for responding. The 
two anchors required to specify a straight line must differ only in their terms that imply a 
difference in quantity.  
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This error is inherent in bipolar format, with scores from positive to negative. The supposed 
‘opposite’ to the positively scored concept is inevitably a different concept, having other 
determinants. The absence of a stimulus is merely noise; it should not be scored as a negative 
feature. As levels of the stimulus are lowered, an adverse attitude may develop at some point. If 
so, perceived absence of the stimulus may be strongly aversive. That can result in a response 
which differs from judging levels of the stimulus nearer the norm and needs to be separately 
measured (e.g., Booth, Higgs et al., 2010, for pleasure and displeasure at different strengths of a 
stimulus). 
Efficiency of method 
The power of such design has been shown by the small number of data needed to obtain 
useful estimates of the norm point and Weber’s fraction for a response/stimulus function from a 
person in a session (e.g., Booth et al., 1983; Booth, Higgs et al., 2010; Conner & Booth, 1992; 
Conner, Haddon & Booth, 1986a; Conner et al., 1988c). If investigators start with a realistic 
hypothesis about a feature, then samples can be selected from the start to have at least two levels 
of that feature at minimum correlation with any other known feature. The response/stimulus 
regression formula works on as few as three samples that include two levels, although of course 
more data provide greater precision. 
That economy of effort contrasts sharply with the large amounts of data collected 
traditionally, and still today, in both academic psychophysics and applied sensory analysis. The 
bivariate regressions also contrast with complex statistical maneuvers unconnected with tests for 
causal mechanisms involved. Norm-zeroed discrimination bypasses the laborious testing 
methods built on Thurstone’s (1927a) principle of comparison and the packages of generic 
statistical models for unfocused collections of data.  
Hence, the thrust of a theory of individuals in situations has been missed if large bodies of 
data are expected in support. Sufficient data can be obtained from an individual in a session to 
characterize what is going on in that mind at that time – for example, 80-99% of the variance in a 
response accounted for by a single discrimination scaled model. Such a finding also shows that 
the participant’s quantitative skills can be trusted.  
Interactions among response-stimulus functions 
 The fitting of each participant’s raw response data to stimulus data scaled in Weber 
fractions from the norm for each session enables the resulting response-stimulus functions to 
combined in theoretically relevant ways. Comparisons among these combinations provide tests 
for specific and detailed hypotheses about the mechanisms by which a mind operates in a 
situation . The second paper in this series takes up this step in analysis.  
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Part Two 
 
How a mind works.   
II. A fundamental theory of the individual’s action, perception, emotion 
and thought  
 
Abstract  
The six simplest sorts of process are specified.  The distinctions among them correspond to 
classic categories of mental mechanism. 
 
Types of norm-zeroed discriminative process 
Ambiguity of a single response-stimulus function   
The psychophysical function from a single response and a single stimulus cannot distinguish 
among the mental processes that could have mediated that discriminative performance. Without 
further data, there is no warrant for the common assumption that a sensation or conscious percept 
is involved, as encapsulated in the subjectivist term ‘magnitude estimation’ (Stevens, 1957). The 
participant may be reacting solely to the level of sensory stimulation, maybe even unconsciously 
(Figure 6). Such a mental performance is often assumed to be merely neural activity. Again 
though, without data that exclude other possibilities, such mediation by any sort of purely 
sensory process cannot be assumed. A third hypothetically feasible mediator is a stimulus-
specific (analytical) verbal categorization process (Figure 6). For example, the assessor may be 
conceptualizing entities that feature different levels of the stimulus and mapping those entities 
into the intensity ratings. 
Figure 6 about here 
Such cognitive ambiguities in standard psychophysical data led to a general theory of types 
of basic mental process involved in any intelligent engagement with the environment (Booth & 
Conner, 1991; Booth & Freeman, 1993). The theory depends on combining response-stimulus 
functions in ways that dig deeper and deeper into the mind of an individual dealing with a 
situation.  
Hierarchy of interactions among response/stimulus transforms 
As illustrated above for a single psychophysical function, a variety of covert mental 
processes could generate the observed transformations of levels of a stimulus into levels of a 
response. Evidence of interactions between two or more observed response-stimulus functions 
might help to disambiguate the interpretation. In particular, the evidence could turn out to be that 
processing of the response and/or the stimulus in one function affects the processing behind 
another function.  
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There has been vigorous argument over the above three possibilities for many decades. Yet 
very little extra evidence is needed in order to distinguish among them. The minimum data are 
two levels of the stimulus and two categories of quantitative response, one of which is more 
inclusive or general than the other. Norm-zeroed discrimination analysis of such data from an 
individual’s session can test for the strength of influence on the broader response from any of the 
above three types of mental process. 
The most overt mental process is measured as the influence of an observed stimulus on an 
observed response, whether the response is highly specific to the stimulus or potentially 
integrates information from two or more stimuli. Also evident directly from the observed data, 
the analytical response category may be used to judge how far the wider situation is from what is 
usually conceived; in this case, there is no direct reference to stimulus levels. A third possibility 
is an inferred process, which therefore has been called ‘indirect’ (Booth & Freeman, 1993). This 
more complex interaction is the influence on the integrative concept of the causal relation 
between the stimulus and the narrower concept. A further step in the hierarchy is for this covert 
response-stimulus function to affect the response-generating process or the stimulus-receiving 
process. These and other identifiable types of mental process are characterized in the following 
subsections.  
Each of these theoretical possibilities is considered in turn as a model for the mental 
causation behind the response to be explained. The strength of influence by each hypothetical 
process on that response can be calculated from observations of an individual in an unchanging 
situation over a period of time that is brief enough for consistent performance.  
Each cognitive model is given an acronym using an S to refer to data on a particular stimulus 
and an R to denote the data from one of the responses. Any causal steps within the influencing 
process are written from first to last, e.g. S2R2 refers to the process of R2 being influenced by S2. 
The regression S2R2 → Rm models the hypothesis that the psychophysical function, R2/S2, 
influences the response being modeled (Rm). If R2 is a culturally accepted term for the concept of 
the affordance S2, then R2/S2 is an ‘analytical’ psychophysical function. 
Six types of influence on a modeled response are now reviewed in turn, from the more 
peripheral to the more central (Petty & Cacioppo, 1986) or shallower to deeper levels of 
processing (Craik & Lockhart, 1972).  
Conceptual influence (R → Rm)  
Effect of another response 
The first type of mental interaction to be considered is a response process that may be 
influencing the response process to be explained (Figure 7a). This is a response (R) model, 
calculated as the regression Rk → Rm.  Such influence cannot come from the overt responding 
itself when that response occurs later than the affected response. Rather the influence can be 
exerted by the mental processing that determines the overt response. Whenever that is the case, 
this influence of the response process on the other response is covert, albeit minimally so.  
Figure 7 about here 
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The first test for this type of mental process was on the effect of the conceptualization of a 
specific feature of an object (Rn) on an overall response to the object (Rm), namely the intensity 
of a taste on the degree of preference for the test sample (Booth & Freeman, 1993). The norm 
point that was constructed from memory and the Weber fraction that was achieved in the test 
session are estimated by least-squares hyperbolic regression from the analytical response to the 
integrative response.  
The calculation does not involve any data on the stimuli presented. This model is based 
solely on patterns of responses. When two or more responses are available in addition to Rm, 
those data need reducing to orthogonal multivariates, e.g. by principal components analysis. 
Nevertheless each response or latent variable is treated as the input to a causal process. Hence 
the analysis is psychophysical in principle rather than purely the psychometrics of patterns in 
responses (Booth, 1995). Conceptualization operates independently of stimulation in other uses 
of memory, such as priming of person recognition (Boehm & Sommer, 2012/in press).  
When objects having many features are used as test samples, sets of the stimulus-specific 
concepts are commonly used in an attempt to pick out different features. Wider judgments of the 
objects may not be elicited. Nevertheless the participant may make broader evaluative judgments 
implicitly, or even explicitly but unrecorded. These more integrative responses may include 
overall judgments, whether categorical such as naming or quantitative such as familiarity or 
attractiveness.  
Measures of response concepts as covert stimuli 
Quantitative responses can be treated as a covert stimulus in a variety of ways. The most 
fundamental approach is to calculate the mental causation of each case of an observed response 
(Rk) from the session’s data and then to test that norm-zeroed discrimination-scaled estimate as a 
stimulus element for the integrative response to be explained (Rm).   
A less laborious but approximate approach is to estimate the causation of each response from 
the session’s varied stimuli only and uses those S models as stimuli to the response to be 
explained. This procedure is also used to estimate the relative contribution of each stimulus to 
the causation of a response. For example, a sensory term such as bright, loud, heavy, bitter or 
smelling-like-a-rose is shown to be analytic if it is dominated in discrimination scaling by the 
hypothesized sensed characteristic, e.g. luminosity rather than hue or saturation, power of the 
sound rather than its frequency, hefted weight rather than applied pressure, caffeine or quinine 
and not citric or malic acids, and the volatiles from roses rather than chocolate or manure. On the 
other hand, terms like savory taste, strawberry aroma, or the flavor of apple or orange, have been 
shown to be integrative -- in those cases, within or across modalities of the chemical senses (e.g., 
Auvray & Spence, 2008; Booth, Kendal-Reed & Freeman, 2010; Booth, Freeman, Konle et al., 
2011). 
The simplest approach, albeit a theoretically crude option, is to estimate the covert stimulus 
from the raw ratings during the session. If not in the format of differences from norm, the ratings 
should be converted to scores with one of the two linearly operative anchors as zero. This zero-
scored anchor should rather be designed to denote the most familiar form of the test sample 
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within the material and social situation simulated by the experimental session. Using this 
procedure, the name for the taste of an ingredient was shown to have a strong influence on the 
rated liking or relative acceptance of samples varying in that ingredient (Figure 1).  
Quantity of a quality 
Quantitative judgments are generally considered to be limited to stimuli that have intensive 
percepts. That view does not allow for complexity of causal structure behind the concept under 
which the judgments are made. In fact, even a feature that can only be present or absent in its 
perceptually pure form has quantities of 1 and 0 (or 100% and 0%). The issue is how such a 
feature can be perceived as partially present, in a position between 1 and 0. A resolution comes 
from the fact that each feature of any entity has a context of other features of that entity. 
Information about the feature has to be extracted from a combination of levels of other features. 
In other words, the norm combines features in quality as well as quantity. The levels of two 
features in a test sample can vary both in combined strength and in degree of off-balance (Booth 
& Freeman, 1973; Booth, Kendal-Reed et al., 2010). Theoretically, strength forms a straight line 
with levels of the two stimuli that are at the ratio in the norm. Off-balance is orthogonal to that 
strength line. When other features are at levels away from their norm, an analytical rating of the 
intensity of a categorical quality may be placed at an intermediate position. In that case, the 
influences on the rating will include the other stimuli. In other words, the analytical response-
stimulus function will no longer be a single line. There will be at least one other line emerging 
from the integrated context. 
Descriptive influence (SR → Rm)   
Theory 
The hypothesis that the integrative response is influenced by the analytical concept (an R 
model) implies an appreciation of such a variation in the situation but with no attention to the 
stimulus to which the concept refers in the culture. The more usual interpretation of an analytical 
psychophysical function is that it measures conscious judgments of the strength of the stimulus. 
Indeed, the analytical terms are commonly called descriptors.   
Hence an alternative hypothesis about an influence of a response concept on the integrative 
response is that the effect of the stimulus on the response in the analytical function (SR) affects 
the integrative response to be explained (Rm) (Figure 7b). This SR model was initially called 
‘indirect,’ to contrast it with ‘direct’ influence from information from the stimulus alone or in the 
response by itself (Booth & Freeman, 1993; Freeman & Booth, 2010). Several other indirect 
processes have been hypothesized since and so this one has been distinguished as causation 
specific to the performance of describing. Applying a socially afforded concept to a material or 
social affordance may be considered to be a minimum specification of the logic of description.  
Calculation 
The potentially analytic response-stimulus function is rescaled in number of Weber fractions 
below or above the norm (cp. Figure 1). That is to say, the level of the stimulus in each sample 
tested in the individual’s session is assigned a directional distance from norm in units of the 
discrimination achieved by that quantitative response.  This response’s norm-zeroed 
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discrimination scale of stimulus levels then serves as the predictor variable in linear regression to 
the criterion of the more integrative response. 
Meaningful influence (SRR → Rm) 
Minimum theory of meaning 
Evidence for the above conceptual (R) and descriptive (SR) influences on a response 
concept, as well as for stimulatory (S) influences (considered again later below), comes 
immediately from observed quantities. Hence these three types of process might be regarded as 
manifest in the data, or at least as sorts of relatively superficial thinking (Petty & Cacioppo, 
1986).  A more elaborated or deeper sort of processing would be an influence on the response to 
be explained (Rm) from the effect of one response-stimulus relationship (SR) on a response (R), 
i.e. an SRR model (Figure 7c). In other words, an overall response can be controlled by a 
description of that response’s concept or of the concept behind another output. In short, the 
described concept gives meaning to the response it explains.  
Motivation or emotion? 
 The content of the conceptualization of the description in an SRR process is specified by 
observed data for those R and S terms. That meaning can be ‘cold’ or ‘hot’, depending on the 
nature of the described concept (the second R in SRR).  
If that concept relates to action, the SRR model is an account of the intentionality within the 
response it explains, such as opting between considered alternatives or expressing an attitude to a 
class of actions. The reasoning in the intention is modeled by the RR component (see next 
subsection). The S in the intentional control of Rm is the goal of the motive or, in B.F. Skinner’s 
terminology, the reinforcer of that operant.  
On the other hand, if the described concept is of reactive output, such as a term for a state of 
mood or an affective process, then that SSR model has the character of emotional content for the 
response accounted for. In I.P. Pavlov’s terms, the S element is the unconditioned stimulus that 
reinforces the conditioned response that is to be made to the to-be-conditioned stimulus.  
For example, the movement of an arm towards another person reaching the top of a stairway 
might be described as reaching out. If the reach is conceptualized as an attempt to help, that is 
intentional meaning. If, instead, the gesture is viewed as a welcome, it has emotional meaning. 
The meaning of the movement could be two-dimensional, both helpful and welcoming. 
Discrimination analysis of data collected on various extents of the reach could diagnose which of 
these mental processes was occurring, in a third party or indeed in either participant in an actual 
incident of that sort.  
Calculation of the effect of a meaning 
The norm-zeroed discrimination distances from the response-stimulus function of an SR 
model are used as stimulus values in a further regression to a response. The discrimination 
distances from the resulting SRR function are used to predict the responses to be explained by 
least squares linear regression. The variance explained can then be compared among models such 
as an SRR with another stimulus and/or response in the descriptive term, SR, R and S models, 
and other models described below.  
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Whatever the specifics of the two R elements and the S element of a meaningful influence, a 
better fit of this SRR model of Rm than of the SR or S models disambiguates the generation of 
the explained response from either description or stimulation. The same applies to its RR 
component, to which we now turn. 
Reasoning influence (RR → Rm) 
‘Deduction’ of one concept from another 
The output being explained can be dominated by the effect an output’s concept on another 
output’s concept (Figure 7d; an RR model).  One conceptual process causing another conceptual 
process is a minimum case of reasoning or, more specifically, of deducing the second concept 
from the first. This reasoning is not necessarily deliberative or effortful. The deduction may be 
involuntary or effortless. Indeed, the effect need have no rational basis. The process could be free 
association of ideas. The two concepts have the strongest connectivity in the semantic network 
which is currently active enough for their nodes to exceed threshold (e.g., Collins & Loftus, 
1975). 
At any given moment, the sensitivity of an intention to its reasoning may be poorer than an 
emotion’s sensitivity to that deductive relation between its concepts. This conflict between two 
processes of meaning (SSR, above) is a minimum model of temptation. 
Reasoned action 
A reasoning process may explain a decision completely, i.e., RR accounts for all the variance 
in Rm. When both the concepts in RR are self-generated, this is a minimum model of free will 
(Baer, Kaufman & Baumeister, 2008; Mele, 2006, 2009). The act is causally determinate but by 
the agent’s own reasons, not by compliance with anyone else. Also the determining causation is 
in the agent’s own mind, not mechanisms in the brain or in society. Furthermore, where the 
concepts have ethical content, the decision is morally responsible, whether or not the agent or 
others consider that it was also correct within a substantive ethic.  
The classical fork between freedom and determinism is incoherent for the same reason. 
Since there are no causal or logical connections between reasoned choice and physical 
movement, there has never been a genuine conflict. Neural or cultural determinacy is beside the 
point. The issue is how action from one’s own reasons is possible by a psychological determinate 
system. The present theory gives an account of such possibilities within the mind, regardless of 
physical or social states. Philosophers, neuroscientists and humanities scholars have to engage 
with psychological science in order to address the conceptual issues effectively. Then the 
traditional mistakes become evident (Mele, 2006; Travis, 2012). 
Third factors 
Correlations among responses are the standard way of screening for influences over both 
events that are hypothesized to be causally related. This strategy assumes that the measure of an 
effect serves also as a measure of the cause.  Hence RR models screen for confounders of 
hypothesized mediators.  
The RR mechanism therefore puts psychology outside the range of problems with time-
lagged multiple-regression analyses of causal networks (Granger, 1969) and more recent 
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structural modeling (Pearl, 2005).  In particular, a mediator of one causal pathway can confound 
the input to another path.  The interactions among influences on behavior actually go on within 
each person’s mind, not along paths between measurement nodes in grouped raw data. If the 
levels of two inputs are observed or manipulated to be uncorrelated, there is no need to be 
concerned with mediators of one input confounding the other input.  
Learned horizontal associates 
A particular sort of association of each of two associated events with a third event involves 
no causation between the pair of events. This includes the fundamental generality of each pair of 
the features of a particular object or situation. The third factor is previous exposure to the 
conjunction of those features.  Neither feature has ever had any influence on the other.  In theory 
of learning and memory and their neural basis, this type of coinciding between events has been 
called a horizontal association, to distinguish it from a vertical association between a cause and a 
consequence (Wickelgren, 1999).  
One form of horizontal association is configuring. This type of performance is considered 
later below, within the broader context of interactions among response-stimulus functions.  
Perceptual influence (SSR → Rm) 
Perception as performance 
We return now to mental process widely invoked in the interpretation of psychophysical 
data, which is distinct from conceptualization (R) and description (SR).  This is mediation by a 
conscious process such as a bodily sensation or a visual image. The private experiences of such 
observable achievements are the philosophers’ qualia (Chalmers, 1996).  In an intentional or 
emotional process (SRR above), a response-generating concept (R) modulates a description 
(SR).  In a perceptual process, a description (SR) modulates a stimulus-generated process (S) 
(Figure 7e).  
That description may be of the same stimulus or a different one.  When the response in an 
SSR process picks out a different stimulus, the modeled response is being controlled by some 
similarity between the two stimuli. Such performance provides evidence that the two sources of 
stimulation act through the same input channels, at least to some extent.   
For example, the savory flavoring compound, monosodium glutamate (MSG), stimulates a 
class of receptors on the tongue for amino acids such as its glutamate component. However, 
MSG also stimulates the other four classes of gustatory receptors, not just sodium salts, but also 
sweet sugars, acids (tasting sour) and the neuron activating binding sites for at least some bitter 
compounds. The question therefore arises whether activation of the glutamate taste receptor can 
be mimicked by configural processing of information from the distinct affordances by a sugar, an 
acid and a bitter substance. When sucrose, citric acid and caffeine were mixed with MSG in 
naturally glutamate rich tomatoes, MSG proved to be on the same dimension as each of the other 
differently tasting compounds by their co-occurrence in a perceptual model (SnSmR) (Figure 8; 
Booth, Freeman et al., 2011). 
Figure 8 about here 
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Causal theories of perception and intention: the unsituated brain 
Perception is often thought of as a picture created by active neural pathways from the eyes or 
other senses.  An analogous view of intention is as a picture of the goal object, which drives the 
contraction of muscles in the limbs or speech apparatus. This has been called destructive 
physicalism (Travis, 2012).  Its logic presumes that the brain could work in a jar with no 
reference to situations outside the body within which senses and muscles work.  
Yet nobody who has tracked through the brain from sensory stimulation to muscle 
contraction has ever seen a sensation, a concept or an act of will. This deficiency in neural 
reductionism cannot be rectified by a dualistic ‘liaison’ interface (Popper & Eccles, 1977) or any 
other theory of ‘upward’ and ‘downward’ causation between brain and mind. There is wide 
recognition -- though still far from universal  -- of the infinite regressive fallacy of stimulation to 
the retina being transformed into pictures viewed in visual cortex (Hamlyn, 1957, 1990; Ryle, 
1949). The same fallacy afflicts the assumption that the intention in an act causes the 
contractions of the muscles in the limbs or the larynx (Anscombe, 1971/1993). 
What makes the anterior temporal gyrus function as auditory cortex is the discriminative 
performance enabled by its connection with sounds through the ear (Booth, 1978b), not 
subjective experience immanent in the local networks (Puccetti & Dykes, 1978). No 
consciousness of stimuli is possible without a culture of attributing states to individuals in the 
presence of such affordances (Wittgenstein, 1953).  
Stimulatory influence (S → Rm)  
The sixth and final type of processing to be described here is control of the modeled 
response by processing of stimulus information alone, without any mediation from concepts 
(Figure 7f). Nevertheless, a feature in the learned norm can be involved and so this stimulatory 
mental causation is not a sensory process (or apperception) driven purely by receptor activity.  
This S type of mental process, together with the R and SR types, was considered by Booth 
and Freeman (1993) in the first formal statement of this approach.  Such purely stimulatory 
influence was initially called ‘direct’ control of the response, because of the contrast with 
indirect control by a response/stimulus relationship (Booth & Freeman, 1993; Freeman & Booth, 
2010; Mobini et al., 2011). The three deeper processes included above (SSR, SRR, RR) were 
included in the theory later (Booth, Freeman et al., 2011; Booth, Sharpe et al., 2011).  One 
example of each of the processes is given in Figure 9 for a study with four stimuli, the response 
to be explained and three other responses. 
Figure 9 about here 
If all the hypotheses of covert processes have been tested and the overt response/stimulus 
function still accounts for the data best, the evidence overall is that the information from the 
source of stimulation acts directly on the response. The ambiguity with the conscious perceptual 
process (SSR) has been removed, as well as the descriptive (SR) and conceptual (R) 
interpretations of the psychophysical function.  Since no monitored conceptualizing has been 
implicated, it is possible that the information from the stimulus has been processed 
unconsciously in generating the modeled response.  It should be noted that the discriminative 
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performance used in this criterion of consciousness is the detection of quantitative differences 
within a category, not a distinguishing between categories (Fisk & Haase, 2005). Also the 
awareness is not of the neural processes involved, nor of the cultural basis of the 
conceptualization; the ‘inside view’ is of the mental achieving, be it perceptual, descriptive, 
reasoned, intentional or emotional.  
Unconscious mentation 
There is a logically asymmetry between evidence for and against awareness of a stimulus.  
Attempting to show that a person is unconscious of a stimulus is trying to prove the null 
hypothesis. The most that can be done is to exclude all other coherent hypotheses.  Personal 
cognition is exhaustively multi-thetic.  Hence analysis of an adequately designed set of 
observations could show that the discriminative performance of all other processes was 
negligible on that occasion, whereas a response that did not involve a relevant concept had 
appreciable differential acuity for direct stimulation (Booth, Sharpe & Conner, 2011a).   
Limited duration of exposure to a stimulus, as in priming designs, does not establish the 
absence of mediating conceptualization that could mediate discrimination or detection (Koulder 
& Dahaene, 2007; Snodgrass, Bernal & Shevrin, 2004).  Failure of a specific concept (R1) to 
detect the stimulus is insufficient to establish perception without awareness (Merikle, Smilek & 
Eastwood, 2001).  Recognition (by R1 explicitly) of the presence of the stimulus (S1) does not 
exclude the possibility that the stimulus (S1) is being conceptualized in another way, such as 
within one of the four other types of discriminative process specified above (R, SR, RR, SRR).  
For example, detection of other features (S2, S3 etc.) of the conscious situation (monitored by 
Rm) could have activated the concept of the undetected feature (R1).  
This design has been implemented for the integrative response of degrees of preference (Rm) 
for supposedly different brands of coffee; the only difference between samples of the 
individual’s usual drink was the concentration of caffeine (S1) added to a decaffeinated brand 
(Booth, Sharpe & Conner, 2011a). In about half of the participants, rated preference 
discriminated between levels of caffeine better than intensity of bitterness did, both before and 
after the term bitter (R1). However, the concept of bitterness is implicit in the concept of coffee.  
Roast coffee contains bitter compounds in addition to caffeine. Strength and mildness of taste are 
features named on packs and a key concern in deciding how much coffee to put into a brew.  
Unsurprisingly therefore, for most participants, distances of bitterness from preferred norm had 
some discriminative acuity for the caffeine in the samples that were tasted before bitter was 
mentioned: the concept was in their minds from the start. Out of the 28 participants whose 
preference ratings discriminated caffeine better than their bitterness ratings, just two had 
negligible discrimination between caffeine levels by implicit bitterness (Booth, Sharpe  et al., 
2011a). Hence only about 7% of the apparently subliminal perceivers of caffeine might in fact 
have been unconscious of its taste before bitterness was mentioned.   
Norm-zeroed discrimination scaling provides rich and precise analysis of factors in 
subconscious affect. The implicit association test draws limited conclusions from multiple tests 
36 
 
of a great number of words provided by the investigator (Greenwald, McGhee & Schwartz, 
1998; Roefs, Huijding, Smulders et al., 2011).   
What is it like to be you or me? 
The distinction between stimulatory (S) and perceptual (SSR) processing illustrates a basis 
for showing how the consciousness of something is possible.  It does not address the issue what 
consciousness is. Some philosophers regard that as an extremely hard problem (Chalmers, 1996).  
Certainly the issues are intractable if the scientific issues of how consciousness is possible are 
conflated with the artistic issues of expressing personal experience (Booth, 2003).  
This game was given away long ago by the title of a key philosophical paper, “What is it like 
to be a bat?” (Nagel, 1974; cp. Hacker, 2002). If people wish to express what it is like to be 
themselves by writing or making pictures or objects, others may (or may not) be appreciative of 
experiencing their creations. The contents of consciousness are like such expressions into and 
from whatever reality the artist lives within (Wittgenstein, 1953). If bats are incapable of public 
comparisons of themselves with each other, a bat cannot compare itself privately with anything 
public, and so there is nothing (subjective) that it is like to be a bat. The present human reader 
and author may or may not have difficulties in expressing ourselves or appreciating each other. 
Nonetheless, our capacities for interacting with others provide good grounds for granting that we 
have self-identifying experiences to express.  
Treatments of consciousness often get off on the wrong foot by presupposing an arbitrarily 
materialist metaphysics (Koons & Bealer, 2010). For example, a leading theorist wrote that “we 
have good reason to believe that consciousness arises from physical systems such as brains” 
(Chalmers, 1996, page xi). That argument, empty of evidence, leads to the view that “we are 
entirely in the dark about how consciousness fits into the natural order” (op. cit.). On the 
contrary, natural order includes human society as well as the human body, even though many 
natural scientists take no account of the mundane processes of communal culture that have 
become an automatic part of their lives. This ability of each member of a culture to share 
information with others on what she or he is doing can become highly integrated. That amounts 
to the agent being aware of what s/he is doing, including the perception, emotion and thought 
that is involved. Such awareness would normally carry some appreciation by the agent of being a 
unitary entity with some characteristic ways of acting. That is what it is like to be you or me.   
Of course this is far from a full scientific account of the competence of being conscious of 
oneself in action, perception and thought. Yet seeking causation within the brain alone, or within 
society alone, let alone within consciousness itself, must be doomed to failure. Consciousness of 
a personal self is widely recognized as having differentiated from consciousness of other people 
but this remains an open question with apes (Call & Tomasello, 2008). They can learn to 
compare themselves objectively with others in some respects, e.g. by recognizing the image in a 
mirror as of their own body (Lin, Bard & Anderson, 1992). The person’s performance on any 
particular occasion is open to investigation, such as by norm-zeroed multiple discrimination 
scaling. How such a competence was acquired is a still further question for a new science of the 
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development of the individual mind within that person’s inherited social and biological 
endowments.  
 
Integration among mental processes 
Differences between features 
We now move to considering the variety of interactions among the active causal functions 
within a mind. The default assumption is that information from different sources is distinct in its 
processing. Where two input patterns do not cohere to a sufficient extent, they continue to be 
processed separately, up to the point where one pattern of output to the environment is generated 
from the patterns from both the sources. Hence, to the extent that sources act differently on a 
sink, their distances from norm combine orthogonally into the size of that response. That is, the 
distances from norm of two features of each test sample should in the first instance be plotted 
onto separate stimulus axes, giving a two-dimensional (2-d) model. The resulting diagonal from 
zero to the pair of observed feature values provides projections for use to match the norm and the 
environment (Booth & Freeman, 1993; Sloman, 1993).  
The ability to distinguish a difference in patterns from examples of the same pattern is not 
uniquely human, nor does it depend on language in human beings (Wasserman & Young, 2010; 
Young, Wasserman & Ellefson, 2007). Telecommunication engineers have long known that 
messages from different people can be transmitted simultaneously along the same physical cable 
using distinct carrier frequencies. The spatial separation between origins (or destinations) does 
not need to be maintained during transmission. Two separate channels could be operated over the 
same neural pathways in the brain, just as two data channels can transmit along one wire. It is the 
contents of information that are kept separate, not the locations within a physical medium. 
Distinct mental processes do not necessarily activate (or inhibit) different regions of the brain.  
Two different words could be conveyed orally and aurally by the same sound. For example, 
the sounds for “eye” and the “I” could be identical in the utterance “I have an eye on you” but 
the meaning conveyed remains totally unambiguous. The same point has been argued against the 
idea that there is a labeled line through the brain for each taste; rather, the distinct patterns of 
afferent activity are distinguished (Erickson, 1982, 2008). The argument is no different for any 
material or cultural category. The medium is not the message.  
In general, the channels of communication across the mind can be handled in a geometric 
model. Each channel can be represented as a Euclidean dimension. Hence whenever channels 
from distinct stimuli interact to influence an integrative response, the predicted output follows 
from Pythagoras’s theorem as the square root of the sum of squares of distances from norm along 
each axis. This calculation, for orthogonally varying sources of information A and B can be 
represented by the formula A Ί B, where the right angle of the Greek capital delta (Ί) stands for 
the operation (for any number of distances) of adding the squares of the distances and then taking 
the square root of the sum. With a third affordance, C, the model becomes three-dimensional, A 
Ί B Ί C, and so on. 
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Dimensions within modalities 
In physical science, a measure may combine quantities of two of more types of phenomena, 
such as space, time, force, mass, charge and so on. Thus the dimensions of force (F) in 
Newtonian physics are mass (m), distance (d) and time (t), or more precisely m.d.t
-2
 (as in F = 
ma, where a is acceleration). This concept of dimension can be applied to modalities of sources 
of information in psychology.  It remains to be clarified how this type of dimensionality relates 
to the dimensions comprising orthogonal discrimination distances from norm but so far they 
appear to be empirically identical. 
Dimensional analyses of sensory modalities. Day vision was categorized as three-
dimensional and night vision one-dimensional (Pugh & Kirk, 1986). That analysis of 
dimensionality was applied to pairs of sweet sugars (Breslin, Beauchamp & Pugh, 1996). These 
two examples apply to classes of sensory receptor  --  retinal rod pigments and cones for vision, 
and lingual taste receptor types culturally categorized as sweet, salty, sour and bitter (Booth, 
2008a; Booth, Freeman et al., 2011).  
Nevertheless, a single dimension of mental processing does not have to have a simple 
biochemical or linguistic base. There is no reason to believe in pre-set neural connections from 
specific receptors on the tongue for sugar to a spinal network that contracts the muscles for 
uttering the English word sweet (and for marking a point under the written word) or to a 
cerebrocortical network that generates a private experience which can be expressed under the 
name of sweetness (Booth, 2008a). Rather the connection is learned during conversation 
deploying the communally agreed symbol for a taste shared by ripe fruits and honey (Quine, 
1974; Wittgenstein, 1953).  
Dimensional analyses of symbolic modalities. Ratings of affect symbolized in words or faces 
have long been resolved into the theoretical constructs of arousal and valence (Davits, 1969; 
Osgood & Suci, 1955; Russell, 2003; Russell & Mehrabian, 1977; Wundt, 1902).  Emotional 
arousal particularly has been treated as having physiological components.  Purely cognitive 
dissociation of arousal and valence has been achieved in grouped data (Kuhbandner & 
Zehetleitner, 2011). Nevertheless there are substantial variations among individuals (Feldman, 
1995).  
Individualized discrimination scaling has been used to test for self-conscious arousal and 
valence in the motivation to eat, expressed while viewing a color photograph of a familiar food 
(Galea, Chechlacz, Booth et al., 2008; see Chechlasz,  Rotshtein, Klamer et al., 2009). Each of a 
large set of food items was rated for strength of that particular motivation, interest or excitement 
(arousal) and direction of affect (valence), i.e. degree of pleasantness. Of the individuals who 
used both concepts of arousal and valence to decide strength of motivation, a majority (63%) 
placed the two concepts on different dimensions (2-d models). Nevertheless the remaining large 
minority combined arousal and valence into a single dimension of desire to eat (1-d models). 
Furthermore a fifth of those who separated some aspects of the two concepts combined other 
aspects into a single dimension also (3-d models). Such findings indicate that, if all motivation is 
a combination of independent factors of arousal and valence, this is not universally evident in 
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conscious processing. In this testing of desire for pictured foods, half the participants treated 
arousal and valence as wholly or partly the same in their involvement in motivation.  
 
 
Discrimination dimensions are not latent variables 
A response’s concatenation of Weber fractions of stimuli is totally different both from a 
convergence between manifest measures of a latent variable and also from a correlation between 
responses, as in a principal component or multivariate. No measures of stimuli are involved in 
the multivariate modeling of patterns in responses or in the multimethod-multimeasure approach 
to validation.    
More widely, there may be analyzable causation of concomitant events apparent in historical 
documentation or identified by grounded theory in narrative text (Glaser, 1998; Strauss & 
Corbin, 1998; Thornberg, 2012).  In some instances, it may be possible to distinguish between 
candidate input and output events and then mount discrimination analysis on a ‘pseudo-
psychophysical’ basis, with words or concepts as input instead of characteristics of materials 
(e.g., Booth et al., 2011a; Conner, Haddon & Booth, 1986b, under review/2013). It would be 
valuable to have side-by-side comparisons between norm-zeroed discrimination and 
conventional qualitative analysis.  
Identity between features  
Summation of distances 
There is a single alternative to the default interpretation that two orthogonal stimulus 
features are on separate discrimination scales. To the extent that information from two sources is 
transmitted summate into a sink, their influences are combined in an indistinguishable way. In 
other words, the two sets of information are transmitted across that mind on the same channel. 
This is a unidimensional (l-d) cognitive model.  Distances below the norm subtract from 
distances above the norm.  For physical stimuli, with axis intervals being ratios of a physical 
measure, subtraction becomes division, while addition of discrimination distances is 
multiplication of physical measurement values.  If the summations of the number of Weber 
fractions from norm in each stimulus from a test sample (A + B) accounts for more variance than 
the square of the sum of their squares (A Г B), the evidence is that the stimuli A and B share a 
feature.  
The environmentalist concept of stimulus equivalence (Sidman, 1994; Sidman & Tailby, 
1982) corresponds to additivity of S models. Response equivalence has many meanings, from 
comparisons between cultures to technicalities of test construction (Johnson, 1998).  If such a 
paradigm were made amenable to norm-zeroed discrimination analyses, one account of 
equivalence would be addition of R models. 
With two stimuli, there is a third possibility beside the 2-d and 1-d cases. The stimuli might 
provide both in part the same information and also entirely distinct information. The channel 
summating the same information from two sources is separate from each of the channels 
transmitting two the distinct sorts of information.  That is, this is a 3-d case.  
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Configuring in learnt personal norms 
Some of the distinct features in a developing norm may become combined onto a single  
discriminative dimension. In addition to a response coming under the influence of a similarity 
between two stimuli, two disparate stimuli might gain control of a single response, for example if 
their co-occurrence predicted a consequence. If stimuli A and B are presented together, an initial 
2-d model A Ί B could become the 1-d model A + B as a result of learning.  Such ‘horizontal’ 
associations (Wickelgren, 1979) have long been studied in animal behavior. 
Psychologists of associative learning have identified various ways in which stimuli can come 
to act together.  If both A and B alone continue to elicit a response after training, and the 
response to A and B together is no greater than the sum of A alone and B alone, then A with B is 
said to be a compound stimulus. If neither A alone nor B alone elicits the response, whereas A + 
B does, then the compound of the two distinct features (A and B) has become a fully configured 
stimulus. This is configuring in the strict sense of developing a ‘third stimulus’ -- a unitary 
super-feature that influences a response, without its component features having any influence 
(Rescorla, 1973; Whitlow & Wagner, 1972).  Nevertheless this criterion can be relaxed to allow 
for effects of categorical similarities between component features and the configuration (Pearce, 
1994). This corresponds to a 3-d model, (A+B) Ί A Ί B, where the sum of the contributions from 
the simple dimensions A and B is less than the contribution from the complex dimension A + B.   
This 3-d model can also show if there is genuine synergy. The usual criterion of synergy is a 
response to the combination that is greater than the response to either component alone (Birch & 
Campbell-Platt, 1994). However, response measures lack the scaling provided by 
response/stimulus measures, which is needed to distinguish synergy from exact summation or 
indeed from subaddition.   
Testing among the hypothesized structures of mental processing 
The best cognitive model 
Much research focuses on testing a single hypothesis by analysis of grouped data. Norm-
zeroed discrimination uses the data from each session with an individual to test among many 
mutually exclusive causal structures. That is, each piece of research in personal cognition tests a 
small set of specific hypotheses against each other on the whole set of data. The question is how 
much better one of the theoretically determinate structures fits the observations than any of the 
others. This contrasts with comparisons among large numbers of minimal hypotheses for 
exclusion of the null hypothesis (Shaffer, 1995). 
Tests of degree of fit to data of hypotheses in personal cognition are based on the simplest 
possible procedure -- comparing models for variances accounted for in least-squares linear 
regression. In contrast to the estimation of values for Weber fraction and norm point that require 
slope and error, only the error is needed to evaluate the success of a modeled interaction among 
mental processes. Each such model has a single discrimination-scaled value for each variant of 
the tested situation. Simple regression from the hypothesized interaction to the response being 
modeled tests each addition of an element for increased r
2
. This contrasts with multiple 
41 
 
regression which tests the effect of adding an observed variable on the variance accounted for.  
The calculations also differ from path analysis and structural modeling, because all the 
hypotheses about mental structure are incorporated in the single value resulting from a cognitive 
model of the data for each sampled variant of the situation.  
Sequence of calculations 
Building complex single dimensions. The first step in search for evidence of interactions 
between discrimination-scaled response is to test each elemental model for similarity with each 
other elemental model. If the r2 value for the sum of the two discrimination distances is greater 
than the r
2
 for either element alone, the summation of those two elements (A + B) is accepted as 
closer to truth than either element alone (A or B).  
The second step is to test each successful two-element 1-d model against the greater 
complexity of summation with the distances from norm for each of the remaining elements. If 
the three-element 1-d model has an r
2
 value higher than each of its three two-element 
components, that model is validated for further testing.  In a third step, if a four-element 1-d 
model (A + B + C + D) has an r
2
 greater than the r
2
 value of any of its four three-element 
components (A + B + C, A + B + D, A + C + D or B + C + D), it is accepted as nearer the truth 
on the available evidence.   
Because increasing numbers of complex components all have to do worse than the model at 
the next higher level of complexity, iterations of this procedure rapidly converge on the best 
unidimensional model. Sometimes an element accounts for more variance than any of the 
summations with another element, leaving it as the only valid 1-d model. In other words, that 
person’s norm recognizes no similarity to any other element in the tested variants of the 
situation.  
Discrimination of similarity between stimulus elements is a powerful way of comparing the 
specificities of sensory receptors. Previous approaches to such dimensionality of a sensory 
modality have been mathematically complex and restricted in generality (Breslin et al., 1996, for 
tastants with unique purity of sweetness). The unidimensionality of sweet sugars has been 
confirmed by this method (Booth, Freeman et al., 2011), together with a single dimension of 
sourness, and its unique power to identify multiple dimensionality in a single stimulus (Figure 8, 
above).  
Building multidimensional models. The second phase of calculation tests all the validated 1-d 
models for inclusion in multi-dimensional models, i.e. using the criterion of the square root of 
the sum of all those 1-d models’ square of each sample’s distance from norm. The logic is 
identical to that for validating complex 1-d models. The r
2
 of the model having one more 
dimension is tested against the r
2
 for each of its component models. The model with the 
additional dimension is only accepted for further testing if it accounts for more variance than any 
of its components. Such increasing dimensionality converges for the same reason as complexity 
of 1-d models. In experience of this approach so far in situations with up to five stimuli and six 
responses, 4-d models have been rare, and 3-d models in a minority. 
Restriction to elements of the same type 
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Each series of calculations that increases the explained variance can be restricted to 
interactions among discrimination-scaled elements of identical type, e.g. all S or all SRR. This 
protocol corresponds to a theory that attention is focused on one sort of task at a time. The 
modeling converges on each type of process separately. Usually in work to date, the best model 
for one type of process accounts for considerably more variance than the best model of any of 
the other processes. Experience thus far also is that opening up the calculation to all processes 
generally yields only small improvements in explanation by the best model of a single type.  The 
potential theoretical significance of such patterns of evidence is considered below in the context 
of examples of cooperative action.  
Differences between individuals 
One set of stimuli presented in a fixed sequence can be processed quite differently between 
individuals. It is not surprising that people vary in their ways of addressing a situation. In order 
to read a mind on an occasion, the investigator and participant need to interact. Yet the design of 
the investigation need not prevent the participant being herself or himself.  
To illustrate, an experiment using purely verbal stimuli and responses provided a striking 
contrast between two individuals. This pair of cases also illustrates the SRR and SSR types of 
process. One woman and one man identified themselves as those who “crave” chocolate on 
occasion. Eight portions of food were described in turn and rated for how much each was craved, 
and how calorie-rich, healthy and chocolatey each portion was. Two levels of the four attributes 
were varied across the eight descriptions with only small correlations between them.  
Both participants gave 2-d models with complex dimensions (Figure 10).  However, one 
used SRR processes and the other had a SSR model. The gender is unspecified because one 
datum provides no logical basis for generalizing.  (Thus any stereotyping by the reader can have 
full reign!)  
Figure 10 about here 
Each participant’s retrospection on the experiment was similar in the relative salience of 
concepts. Some specifics of interpretation of the models were illuminated. This illustrates the 
close relation of conceptualized performance to phenomenology. Yet there is no direct relation 
between a concept and a feature of the material world (qua Fechner) or a region of brain activity 
(as phrenological versions of neural reductionism require). 
The investigator as another mind – or the same one  
This approach to psychology tests multiple interpretations or hypotheses on data that are 
collected in contexts that are selected to be relevant. Study of the workings of a mental system is 
joint performance by investigator and participant that is in principle public. The investigator is 
another embodied and acculturated system who also attends actively or reactively, learns and 
remembers, and perceives and describes. In particular, an effective investigator makes records 
that are comprehensible by others who are equally familiar with the context of the investigation.  
All the above could be done by a participant who has the competencies of an investigator.  
Hence at the start of some lines of research, it may be possible for an investigator to meet these 
conditions for effective investigation while also being the participant (Booth, 2004). 
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Joint intention, fellow feeling and empathic perception 
Cognitive-affective-conative processes of acting jointly   
The psychology of cooperating with and helping others continues to be dominated by multi-
item questionnaires focused on the phenomenology of empathy and sympathy, despite the recent 
rise of experimental analysis of interpersonal performance. The inventories’ subscales purport to 
distinguish between cognitive and affective aspects but in terms of what respondents feel, rather 
than how well they perform (e.g. Davis, 1983, and many updates).  The psychometric approach 
also focuses on traits with little specification of the situations in which they are expressed.  The 
experimental approach seeks to characterize capacities using specially constructed test situations.  
Neither approach is suited to explaining ordinary helpfulness and cooperation, or designing ways 
to encourage such practices. 
Multidimensional norm-zeroed discrimination points to a new sort of experimental 
psychometrics, based on the causally most powerful features of interpersonal performance in 
commonly occurring situations.  If there are personal and situational traits of empathic cognition 
and sympathetic affect, they should emerge from generalizing across individuals and scenarios.   
The inputs to ongoing mental processing are signals from the other person and the context.  
The outputs are expressed responses to the situation. The psychometric distinction corresponds 
to the attribution of rationally intentional and/or emotionally reactive meaning to the 
interpersonal situation, i.e. motivation to help or cooperate and feeling compassionate. This is a 
distinction between sorts of concept (R) driving the description (SR) in the SRR processes in 
Figure 11. Empathy is more than that: it involves perceiving (or even undescribed sensing) of the 
other person’s part in the situation.  Perception of need provides a reason for acting and may fuel 
both distress and concern in the perceiver (Figure 11). 
Figure 11 about here 
This network model of mental processes in situations for helping or cooperating raises 
question about the interpretation of outcomes of discrimination analysis. Interacting all the 
processes, regardless of type, could put a pathway of causation onto a single dimension, and 
different pathways on separate dimensions.  If the calculations restrict interactions to one type of 
process, then the best model may represent the one focus of attention, such as distress at the need 
of the other person or a conflict between reasons for acting in the specified situation.  However, 
that interpretation would not be secure unless the best model accounted for most of the variance 
in the intention to act. If it took two or more models with different types of process to cover all 
the variance, then the possibility should be considered that they are both or all active. Indeed that 
interpretation would be supported if the best unrestricted model combined the two types. 
Example of disposition to help 
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Many recent experiments on helpfulness, such as donating to charity, use the amount of 
money contributed as a measure. A survey might estimate the outcome of an appeal but cash 
response introduces extraneous variables such as available income. A theoretical understanding 
of helping is better based on disposition to help, when assessed without distortions of linear 
response-stimulus relationships.   
A simple illustration is provided by responses to vignettes of an appeal for donations towards 
a wheelchair for a person with limited mobility. The three stimuli varied independently across 
vignettes were severity of the disability (S2), cost of the wheelchair (S1), and the availability or 
not of a subsidy (S3). Participants rated each vignette first for the likelihood that they would 
donate any cash (R1) and then how great the need was for a donation (R2) and how bad the 
disabled person felt (R3).   
The best model for a majority of participants included both rational and emotional factors in 
willingness to donate. For example, one two-dimensional solution (r2 = 0.91) added the rated 
need (R process) to the disabled person’s distress at their disability (SR process) on the dominant 
dimension and had just stimulation from the cost of the wheelchair (an S process) on the other 
dimension.  Since perceived need was similar to perceived distress, that major dimension might 
be operating affectively. Therefore this model could be evidence for the emotional and 
intentional pathways running in parallel. 
Another participant also had a 2-d model as the best (r2 = 0.85) but both dimensions 
appeared to be rational, perhaps about the assessment by the expert advisors to the supplier of a 
subsidy.  The subsidy was the major dimension and the disability the minor one.  Two SSR 
models tied with that S model, each applying one response concept to both the stimuli. This was 
the rated need in one model and adjudged distress of the disabled person in the other.  This may 
indicate that an affective pathway was operative but within the context of a rational deferral to 
expert opinion.  A third participant appraised disability (more) and cost (less) but with affective 
and rational routes on the same dimension, both distress and need conceptualizing cost on the 
same dimension (r
2
 = 0.91). 
These diagnoses of individuals’ mental processing while considering an appeal to help a 
person are encompassed by the outline theory of empathy and compassion (Figure 11).  This 
illustrates how norm-zeroed discrimination scaling of perception, emotion, and action with 
reasons, can outdo both the scoring of individual differences on situationally under-specified 
psychometric subscales, and also those experimental tasks that are limited to testing particular 
hypotheses one at a time on sets of individuals.  If there are stable differences between people in 
the power of different features of joint intention across situations, they will be found in data from 
life.  Indeed, if actual occasions of help and cooperation have commonalities in their stimulus 
and response features, then situations will be shown to have traits too (Bem & Funder, 1978).  
The same principles apply to the norm-zeroed discrimination of socio-effective signals from 
movements of the face (cf. Calvo, Fernández-Martín & Nummenmaa, 2012). 
Determinacy versus loose parameters 
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Parameter-free fitting to data 
The theory of discrimination-scaled distances from norm yields an arithmetically 
determinate equation for the effects of each salient feature and its potential interactions with 
other features. The direct approach is to measure the stimulus quantities for features that are in 
common among the objects to be tested. Such measurements may not be readily available, 
however. In some cases, they may even be impossible in principle. Nevertheless, an indirect 
approach is also feasible. Quantitative judgments specific to each affordance can serve as 
surrogates for the direct measure of that stimulus, so long as those responses are validated by 
consensus among participants.
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Procedures like this are in wide use but not set within the psychophysical framework expounded here.   
For example, each participant can be asked to name the characteristic features of a first 
sample of a category of objects. Additional feature names may be elicited by subsequent samples 
in that category. Each person’s list usually ends within two or three samples. Those names can be 
used to assess the strength of each feature in quantitatively assessed samples. Means across 
participants’ normally distributed scores can serve instead of physical measurements in the same 
participants or, better, in other participants living within the same social and material 
environment (e.g., Conner, Haddon & Booth, 1986b, 2013/under review; Freeman, 1996; 
Freeman & Booth, under review; Mobini et al., 2011). 
Other common approaches invoke loose parameters, with values specified on the criterion 
merely of better fit to data. The enterprise is presented as a search for high level scientific 
principles (Stevens, 1961; Shepard, 1987, 2004). In the end, it offers no more than highly 
degenerate hypotheses. Even though the fitted function is elevated to the status of scientific law, 
the numerical values of its constants are not treated as a critical empirical issue. The scientific 
approach would be to state a theory that implies a limited range of values for each constant, and 
then to test that hypothesis on diverse new data.  
Power functions with loose exponents 
Fechner’s mistake of ignoring the increases in Weber’s fraction at low and high levels of 
stimulation was compounded with two additional errors by S.S. Stevens (1957, 1961). First, 
instead of providing two response anchors within the range of Weber fraction constancy, Stevens 
presented an arbitrary initial stimulus level and used the number the assessor assigned as the sole 
anchor. The second error was to assume that instructing the assessor to assign ratios of that 
anchor to subsequent test stimuli gave numerical ratings that were in ratio and therefore could be 
transformed into logarithms without any mechanistic justification. Stevens replaced Fechner’s 
graph of logarithmic stimulus values against responses with logarithmic response values, to give 
a log-log plot. This is a power function in its linear form. The slope of the fitted straight line is 
the power exponent.   
Such tinkering with response values is questionable because those are the data to be 
explained. Furthermore, taking logarithms of both variables moves almost any shape of a 
monotonic function closer to a straight line (McBride, 1985). One exception, ironically, is a 
semi-logarithmic function, such as the Weber-Fechner equation. What saves some data from 
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favoring ratios of only medium stimulus values is an extreme value which could have been 
biased by the instructions to respond in ratio. Hence a power function should only be fitted to 
data when it does better than more specific functions, such as linear and semi-logarithmic (e.g., 
Newman & Booth, 1981). 
A power function without any theoretical specification of the exact value of its exponent is 
nothing like a scientific law on the model of physics. The intercept of a power function has no 
logical meaning. In short, the postulation of a power law for psychophysical functions is a highly 
degenerate hypothesis. 
The first steps in scientific testing of power functions in psychophysics would be to confine 
ranges to Weber fraction constancy, to show that the exponent from each set of data differs 
reliably from one in the same direction, and to replicate any departure from unity. Then those 
data should be tested for difference from the consensus among previous estimates for that 
modality.  
However, an exponent less than one can be generated by at least three factors extraneous to 
modality. Merely the investigator’s choice of physical unit can halve the exponent (Myers, 
1982). Wide ranges of stimulus levels rated in ratio are liable to produce numbers that extend up 
or down by hundred[th]s; ratings that go across decimal orders are likely to lower the slope of 
the power function because of compression bias across decade orders. Levels of the stimulus that 
extend both above and below Weber fraction constancy will produce lower exponents than 
stimulus ranges that go only above or only below. Hence the values of the exponent of a straight 
line fitted to a log-log response-stimulus function are bound to be sensitive to variation among 
ranges of stimulus levels (Teghtsoonian & Teghtsoonian, 1978). 
Exponents greater than one have been seen for some stimuli like electric current. That could 
be because the assessor changes the meaning of the quantitative responses at high levels of 
stimulation. Attention is no longer on the strength of prickles from the current. Instead the 
ratings jump upwards to express pain, or fear of electric shock. Assessors must be allowed to 
provide alternative descriptors and discrimination functions compared with rivals for the ratings 
on each concept. 
Psychophysicists should never have sought a single equation to cover responses to all levels 
of stimulus. Weber’s fraction and Fechner’s constant stimulus cannot be ignored. If the design of 
an experiment allows increases in the fraction and switches in the implicit standard, such 
anomalies must be identified and accommodated in the analysis of the data. Evidence is needed 
on which mental processes transform the stimuli into the responses. Hence, the psychophysical 
equations have to test among the theoretical possibilities. Furthermore, response-stimulus 
relationships should be tested in contexts in which the previously evidenced cognitive 
mechanisms can work.  It should not be possible for psychophysics to become isolated from 
mainstream psychological science.  
The poverty of the theory-free psychophysics is further exposed when combinations of 
stimuli are considered.  Experimentally varied mixtures of tasted or smelled compounds have 
been studied extensively. Rated intensities are generally suppressed by mixing. Yet the degree of 
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suppression is described by a cosine, with the angle contingent on fit to the data (Cain et al., 
1995).  Another approach is to compare shapes of stimulus interactions in the integrative 
response between additive (parallel plots) and multiplicative (fan plot) in ANOVA (Anderson, 
1981). This also is a data fitting approach without a base in mechanistic theory. 
Loosely parameterized object recognition spaces  
The psychology of the recognition of objects has a worse history than psychophysics. There 
has been the same preoccupation with grand abstract laws, supposedly imitating physics. 
However, the basic principles of classical, relativistic and quantum physics cover the quantitative 
minutiae of observed relationships between the conditions of observation and the observed 
consequences. Models of object recognition include only responses to objects, treated as 
unspecified categories. The models include no data on the stimuli, even the categories of their 
features, let alone the quantities as in psychophysics. Indeed, an early proposal that the distances 
between objects depended on features that they shared was dismissed as quantitative (Shepard, 
2004, citing work in the 1960s published as S. Russell, 1988). Yet the distances inferred from 
responses are quantities, even though constructed by non-metric modeling.  Indeed, the 
responses themselves are quantitative too, such as degrees of dissimilarity. Yet Shepard (1958, 
1965) was one of the first to exploit the psychophysical identity between what the behaviorists 
called generalization of learned responses to a stimulus and what is rated by human subject as 
similarity between two stimuli. The tradition of ignoring the specifics of stimuli runs deep. In a 
reconsideration of relations between objects and features, the matching of feature levels to norm 
was discounted as applicable only to features presumed (erroneously) to be innately intensive 
(Lockhead, 2004).   
In addition, object recognition models suffer even more than Stevens’s power law from the 
degeneracy of underspecified parameter values – sometimes as many as four parameters (e.g., 
Lamberts, 2000). Such models can be adjusted to fit almost any data, without taking any account 
of the specifics of the tested objects and their features. They are empirically very difficult to 
distinguish from other models of response patterns, such as random sampling of features in the 
implicit norm (Nosofsky & Palmieru, 1997).    
For example, controversy has raged over a key parameter in models of dissimilarity, namely 
the order of Minkowski space, e.g. two (Euclidean) or one (city block). Worse, non-integer 
orders have been proposed, such as between two and three, as though the theoretical meaning of 
the best fitting formula was of no concern.  
Many sets of data showed a convex downward pattern. This was postulated to be exponential 
and that interpretation elevated to a general principle (Shepard, 1987). Yet the data were not 
subjected to analysis for the values of exponent(s).  Furthermore, objects that are hard to 
discriminate give convex upward functions (Nosofsky, 1986).  
Even if all the parameters’ values in a model of responses generalized across diverse sets of 
data, such a model would remain an unprincipled fix. The need is for evidence on the likely 
complications of judging similarity when some features are shared, and when the shared features 
vary across pairs of objects. To make adequate contact with psychological reality, the modeling 
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of patterns in responses needs to be augmented at the very least by identified categories of 
feature.  
 
 
Probability versus content   
The distinction between the slope and variance of a psychophysical function has profound 
implications, not only for psychological measurement, but also for all information science and 
engineering. The quantitative relationships of responses to stimuli specify the content of the 
information that is processed. The interactions (illustrated below) between the mental processes 
producing each observed response-stimulus relationship specify the basic structure in which that 
content is organized. In contrast, amount of information (number of bits) is simply the inverse of 
entropy or the amount of randomness (Shannon & Weaver, 1949). The number of bits 
transmitted or stored implies nothing about the meaning of the message or the content of the 
memory, or about the way that the information is structured (Garner & Hake, 1951).  
Probability distributions have been used in an attempt to quantify the whole of the 
information being processed in a mind (Tononi, 2008). However, scaling only in probabilities 
does not encompass the structured content of the conscious or unconscious processing. The 
distances have to include the categories and amounts that have the probabilities. Weber’s fraction 
as the unit of distance includes the slope as well as the variance.   
The complexity of information processing in a system has been interpreted as causal density 
(Seth, Barrett & Barnett, 2011). However, the proposed measure of complexity accounts only for 
the amount of information. The specification of a causal process includes the slope of the effect-
cause function, not just the variance it explains. Measures of the content and structure of the 
information are needed in addition if the density is to be of causation, not merely a derivative of 
entropy.  
During integrative responding, the conditional probability distributions for the component 
stimuli can be tested for closeness to statistically optimum combination (Ernst & Banks, 2002; 
van Beers, Sittig & van der Gon, 1999). However, such probabilistic analysis of sensory 
integration does not elucidate its mechanisms. Indeed, Bayesian approaches are subject to the 
general criticism that they neither generate nor take account of process theory (Jones & Love, 
2011).  
Furthermore, it is recognized that learning is required to integrate commonly used 
experimental stimuli (Ernst, 2007). A learned combination of stimuli can be structured as a 
single configured stimulus, functioning as distinct from its components. In such cases, the 
statistical properties of each stimulus in the learnt combination no longer contribute to the 
integration (Booth, 2013). Hence good prediction from the Bayesian priors for the different 
sources of information may in fact indicate a lack of integration in any mechanistic sense of the 
term. The test combinations may be too artificial for a well integrated norm to be learned during 
the experiment, or at best until the later stages (cp. Stewart et al., 2005).  
The pseudo-social fog of 20
th
 century psychology  
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The name of the scholarly discipline of Psychology originally meant knowledge about the 
mortal human soul (a word still extant in cliché, such as S.O.S., and the life and soul of the 
party). In modern terms, that means the systematic empirical study of the individual’s life or, 
more specifically, of a person’s mental life. Yet, for almost a century now, academic psychology 
has mostly studied quasi-social artifacts. These are generated by analysis that starts by lumping 
together the data gathered from individuals. No evidence is gathered on potentially relevant prior 
social interactions among the individuals studied. Hence the ‘grouped’ data do not relate to any 
psychosocial reality. At best, the investigated set of individuals is selected to be a representative 
sample of mutual strangers from a specified population. So the results for the ‘group’ may bear 
no relation to what is going on at the level of an actual group in the population. Indeed, none of 
the individuals generating the data may be at the experimental mean value or making use of the 
psychometric consensus construct.                                                                                                        
This lumping of raw data across individuals began with the use of correlational statistics to 
give scores to individuals on scales created from answers to items in questionnaires (Spearman, 
1904/1987; Nunnally & Bernstein, 1994). The focus on lumped data became effectively a 
universal requirement half a century ago, when the assignment of the variance in responses to 
features of the test situation presented at two or more fixed levels was adopted by experimental 
psychology from agricultural science. As a result, minority patterns are ignored.  In questionnaire 
scaling, much more powerful individual differences may be lost in the search for the lowest 
common denominator of consensus. In experimental work, the theoretically most important 
results may be in those who go the opposite way from the central tendency, even when the mean 
difference between conditions is reliable. 
Nevertheless, the scientific viability of experiments on individuals is recognized in journals 
of psychophysics. Interpretation of individuals’ data has also been a strong tradition in the 
experimental analysis of the control of rates of a response by environmental contingencies. In 
both these parts of psychology, consistency among findings from two or three individuals is 
required but the individuals are not scaled and the size of an effect is not estimated from grouped 
data. Furthermore, the interpretation of coherence in an individual’s extended verbal expression 
is a well recognized scholarly procedure in the movement that goes by the name of qualitative 
psychology. The data that should be combined or compared across individuals are their own 
characteristics of performance, not the unanalyzed observations. 
The same principle applies to the scenarios on which individuals are measured.  Research 
based on the cognitive contributions of features shared among situations would generate a fully 
situated psychometrics.  
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Part Three 
 
How a mind works. 
III. Development of an acculturated and embodied human life 
Abstract  
Learning is specified as a change in the norm induced by exposure to a related incident.  
Development is treated as the acquisition of structure to the content processed as a disparity 
between present and past. 
 
Causation within a mind 
Mental processes as causal 
An event is being causative if it is influencing another event (Mumford & Anjum, 2011). 
Hence, if a mental process is the influence of one pattern of information on another informational 
pattern, this is a cause-effect mechanism. An observable action or reaction constitutes evidence 
that there is some mental causation generating that overt output. When such a response varies 
consistently with observable variation in a stimulus, there is more specific evidence about causal 
processes in that individual which have transformed input patterns extracted from the 
environment into output patterns injected into the environment. Mental causation has a place 
alongside other causation in current philosophical analyses (Maslen, Horgan & Daly, 2009). 
Gibson (1966) distinguished between the source of information in the environment (an 
affordance) and the information extracted from that stimulus by the perceiver. Similarly, a 
distinction needs to be drawn between the information processed by an agent to generate a 
response and the affording of that response by the environment (Gibson, 1979). The mental event 
that accounts for the performance of an action is an intention (Anscombe, 1957, 1971/1993). To 
the extent that the response comes instead from a meaningful involuntary reaction, the 
determining mental event may be an emotion. 
It should be noted that the causality of a mental process is not a representation of a causal 
process in the environment. The occurrence of mental causation is totally distinct from a 
person’s attribution of causation to aspects of the environment. The mental processes mediating 
the perception of causes will be causal, but so will be the processes mediating other perception 
and all other sorts of public achievement and private experience.  
Mental causation should not be equated with physical causation, such as that within the body 
and brain, or with social causation as within a community’s culture and language (Cartwright, 
2004; Casini, 2012; Godfrey-Smith, 2009; Psillos, 2009; Reiss, 2011). How people’s own social 
and bodily lives relate to their mental lives will be considered briefly in this the third paper in 
this series, in the context of the science of individual development. 
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Evanescence of active causation 
Causal powers and susceptibilities may be actuated transiently, rather than continuously 
without start or finish. An event is an active cause only for the period of time during which its 
influence is operative on another event. Such a causal process cannot be directly investigated 
before it has begun or after it has ended. These points can also be made in terms of the 
persistence of the influencing and influenced events.  
Quantitative characterization of a particular causal process requires a series of tests at 
different levels of the source of the influence over the effect. These tests have to be made either 
during an active period that lasts long enough or in a set of periods during which the same 
temporary process is re-activated. 
This requirement can be satisfied in investigations of sets of participants, by conducting one 
test or set of tests in each person and varying the levels of the influence(s) among people. In 
contrast, when causation in one person at a time is being studied, the repetitions have to be 
across a single session of data collection. Also, that session has to be short and stable enough for 
the active causal processes to continue or to be reinstated without change at each test. If a 
process or the active structure of processes does change, only the tests with self-consistent results 
will help to characterize a particular set of the processes that occurred. 
Consistency within an individual across sessions also needs to be examined. Sessions some 
time apart carry increased risk of a change in the dynamics of the individual’s performance. 
Nevertheless, an individual may be totally self-consistent across recurring occasions of a 
particular situation. Degrees of self-inconsistency may be compared among individuals or 
situations. Inconsistency within an individual or situation is distinguishable from random 
variation in the usual way, by comparison with inconsistencies among a variety of individuals or 
situations respectively.  
Causal strength is differential acuity  
On this account, the mental causation that mediates the effect of a stimulus on a response is 
identical to the discriminative process of the response’s sensitivity to differences in level of the 
stimulus. The two conceptualizations are simply the logical inverse of each other. The apparently 
contrasting interpretations depend equally on the evidence that differences in a response relate to 
differences in a stimulus.  
Hence the strength of influence of information extracted from the environment on an 
individual’s entering of information into the environment can be measured as the discriminative 
sensitivity of that response for that stimulus. If a response’s discrimination between stimulus 
levels can be estimated rapidly and non-invasively, that differential acuity provides a basic 
measure of the salience of that stimulus, and indeed is evidence of some form of attention to it. 
At a particular time, the finer the present discrimination between levels of a feature of the 
situation, the greater is the salience of that feature to that response by the individual. Evidence of 
current lack of attention can come from momentarily poor discrimination between levels of a 
feature which are distinguished well on other occasions.  
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Of course, additional evidence is needed to separate a lack of effortful attention from the 
failure of a feature to grab attention involuntarily. The explanation of the inattention under those 
conditions is also a matter for further investigation: is it distraction, masking by other features, 
known irrelevance, a neural interrupt, or what? The present approach provides a measurement of 
degree of attention which is independent of the indicator response and the matter attended to, as 
well as of the factors accounting for salience.  
Symbolic responses and stimuli 
Material and social environments   switch headings with above within part 3 
The mental events subjected to causal analysis may use information from physical quantities 
such as duration, distance or energy. Alternatively, the stimuli and responses may be cultural 
symbols, such as words in sentences, icons within a conventional display, and gestures or other 
non-verbal actions (Pollio, 1974). The symbolic information has meaning and can convey 
knowledge and so is often called semantic (Medin & Barsalou, 1994). Within the subculture 
shared by a research participant and an investigator, the pressing of a reaction time button is a 
symbolic act. Some environmental changes are polysemic, containing both cultural and physical 
information. Examples include facial movements, the tone of voice, presenting a picture, logo or 
signature tune, or the wearing of a perfume or style of clothing or haircut.  
In other words, the sources and sinks of the information transmitted by a mental process can 
be categories and quantities either of sensed and moved material characteristics of objects and 
situations, or of symbolic attributes of cultural systems, conveyed in language, graphics or other 
media. 
Physical stimulus ratios imply symbolic stimulus intervals  
The quantitative responses of interest to Fechner (1860) were in verbal categories, while the 
stimuli were material. The linearity of Fechner’s equation depends on the stimulus axis being in 
logarithms of a physical measurement of the quantity of stimulation, i.e. equal ratios of the 
material measure on equal lengths of the axis. However, the verbal categories also can serve as 
stimuli, with either verbal or physical responses. The semi-logarithmic equation for a material 
stimulus and a verbal response implies that verbal stimulus quantities should not be converted to 
logarithms but should remain on the stimulus axis as equal lengths (intervals) for equal 
differences in symbolic quantity. The argument is as follows (Booth & Freeman, 1993).  
Consider the psychophysical functions for two different quantitative verbal responses to the 
same material stimulus, e.g. felt pressure on the skin and discomfort, or ratings of the pinkness of 
a rose petal and of familiarity with the variety of rose. Both responses are linear on equal ratios 
of the physical measurement of the stimulus. Therefore each of the two responses will be linear 
on equal intervals of the other verbal category as a stimulus, e.g. the discomfort from a felt 
strength of pressure or degree of familiarity with a rose having a particular hue.  
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Social and material realities 
Psychological research has been diverted and distorted by the foundationalist fallacy within 
empiricist philosophies -- namely, that all knowledge is based on subjective experiences relating 
to material sources of input to the senses. The meaning conveyed by a symbol cannot be reduced 
to material stimulation or responding. Rather, the cultural system within which the symbol works 
provides a great variety of functional relations to societal as well as physical processes (Quine, 
1974). Some words in a language are names for entities but, in general, sentences are not pictures 
of realities in the mind, the brain, the community or the material environment (Wittgenstein, 
1953; cf. Bloor, 1983). Hence, conceptual processes cannot be grounded in sensory processes 
(Barsalou, 2008). Indeed, it is hard to see how sensory information could reach consciousness 
without grounding in conceptual processes that are shared in a culture (Wilson-Mendenhall, 
Barrett, Simmons & Barsalou, 2011). The stimulus equivalence classes of the radical 
behaviorists are indifferent to materiality or sociality (Sidman, 1994).   
Hence, the productive research questions are quite different from such issues. What 
functional contribution in the individual’s performance does the sensed information make to the 
concept, and conceptual information make to the sensing? Have sensory and conceptual inputs 
been configured by the individual into any of the physical or symbolic responses to the tested 
situation? How does such variety of mental performance come into being in a human person? 
In broad terms, learning during development builds environmentally afforded norms for both 
the sensed characteristics of material objects and the culture’s symbolic attributes of any 
recurring entity. Rather few exemplars can be sufficient for inferences from probability 
distributions (Shi, Griffiths, Feldman & Sanborn, 2010; cp. learning from new mixtures of 
odorants:  Booth, 1995). Hence each newly presenting situation is likely to activate one or more 
personal norms that have already been built from potentially relevant categories and levels of 
features. On the theory of norm-zeroed discriminations, this acquired capacity has determinate 
mathematical and observational specifications. Some general implications of this approach are 
now detailed.  
The autonomy of mental processing  
Integration of biosocial features into object recognition 
In order to recognize an entity in the environment, information from physically or socially 
distinct sources has to be brought together in the mind. However, such integration of information 
does not need to be a mental process separate from the achievement of recognition. There is no 
need to invoke some faculty such as attention to do the integrating. Rather, attention to features 
of the object is another way of describing the processing of features that are integrated within the 
norm for that object in situations like that pertaining. That is to say, the integration of features 
into the perception of the object is neither a bottom-up stimulus-driven process nor a top-down 
attentional process. The mental processing involves both memory and perception at all levels. 
Use of the learnt norm is afforded by the environment during input and affords the environment 
during output. 
54 
 
Of logical necessity, the features that constitute an object or situation have to be connected 
together, whether by configuring or some other type of integration (Booth, 2013). Therefore it 
tells us nothing extra if we find connections in the brain between afferents that transmit 
information from each source, or connections in the language between the individual’s verbal 
concepts.  
The questions that need answering first are psychological, such as whether an object’s 
features are partly or wholly configured. Responses demanding analytical tasks, based on 
differentiations and similarities among norms for distinct objects and contexts, may or may not 
have different sensitivities to the features that were configured to carry out the integrative task. 
The answers are unlikely to be generalizable among people who differ substantially in relevant 
previous experience. 
Non-mental bases of feature integration 
Information from different stimuli has to be exchanged mentally if that incoming 
information is to be integrated into a response. Such mental processing requires activity in 
connections both within the brain and within the community. Which neural and cultural 
connections are used by the mentation has been developed during prior learning of norms for 
discrimination. Connections are strengthened and/or weakened during an individual’s 
configuring of a norm, and during any differentiation from other norms. This dynamism of the 
learned norm during perception has its correlates in the brain (Imagoglu, Kahnt, Koch & Haynes, 
2012). Its cultural correlates are simulated in experiments on the creative integration of features 
as rumors are spread (Bartlett, 1932; Garro, 2000) 
Neuronal and cultural basis of learning 
The neural basis of the learned multi-featured norm consists of interconnected adaptive 
synapses which are sparsely distributed (Kanerva, 1988; Linhares, Chada & Aranha, 2011) 
within the feature-specialized neural pathways (Booth, 1967, 1973; Uttley, 1970, 1976). Hence 
the activation of a region in the brain by the sensing of different sources of feature does not add 
to knowledge if convergence of the afferent synapses on cells in that region has already been 
shown. Regional activation shows only that the afferents reach the same region, not that they are 
connected. Even if they are connected, the question remains which sort(s) of integration those 
connections take part in. Evidence of the formation and breakage of connections leaves open 
what information is transmitted by such changed connectivity (Kourtzi & Conner, 2011).  
Similarly, conceptual connections in a language imply nothing about speakers' mental 
processes (pace Whorf, 1956). Evidence of changes in linguistic usage leaves open what any 
individual has contributed to such cultural change, and what the changes have contributed to a 
person’s thinking. The new verbal responses to a changed situation may strengthen or weaken an 
existing historical tendency. On occasion, the individual’s development initiates a cultural 
change. A routine aspect of individual development is a cultural truism and makes no difference 
to the society, except as a stabilizing factor. 
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Neural binding between features  
The erroneous materialist reduction of mind and its causal theory of perception generate a 
pseudo-problem.  If one assumes that the stimulus features of an object cause neuronal activity in 
specific sensory regions of the brain, the question arises how such activity is ‘bound’ into the 
neuronal activity causing the multi-featured percept (e.g., Wolfe & Cave, 1999). Non-causal 
theory (such as here and in Gibson, 1979) does not separate memory from perception. The 
physical machinery for recognizing environmental entities by matching to acquired multiple 
featured norms can operate in automatic mode or be exploited by effortful analysis into features 
and search for their conjunctions. For example, the determinate norm-zeroed discrimination of 
integrated features can provide a basis for probabilistic strategies (Vul & Rich, 2010). 
Norm-zeroed discrimination also helps to reconcile generic with specialized theories of the 
recognition of locations (Jeffery, 2010; Pearce, 2009). For example, a norm for a location based 
on visual and tactile cues, or olfactory and kinesthetic cues, could be acquired by general 
associative principles but perform as a specific spatial configuration. 
Cultural binding between features  
Social reduction implies that connections in the language are needed to bind features in the 
mind. Yet it is clear that language is generative. Furthermore, verbal expression can be 
incoherent. 
Contrary to minds being societal constructions, symbolic processes in a mind can provide 
meaning to the culture, as much as affordances in the culture permit the output of information 
from mentation. ‘Top-down’ influences of historical context interact with ‘bottom up’ effects of 
communicating to others, within mental processing that cannot be reduced to or explained by the 
linguistic specifics or other events at the societal level (cp. Broesch & Hadley, 2012). 
Synesthesia and its development 
Crossmodal triggering 
In synesthesia, a specific sort of stimulation in one sensory or symbolic modality evokes a 
discrete experience in another modality without any corresponding stimulation. Examples of 
synesthesia include the experiencing of color on seeing a letter of the alphabet, or the thought of 
a number, a letter or a day of the week when viewing a colored object (Rich, Bradshaw & 
Mattingley, 2005). A particularly instructive case of seeing colors in letters was tracked back to 
specifically colored letters in a set of refrigerator magnets seen frequently as a child (Witthoft & 
Winawer, 2008).  
Nevertheless, a case of synesthesia can be hard to explain in terms of likely previous 
circumstances. That may simply be because of the difficulty of identifying specific events in 
early childhood that are potentially relevant. The original source of a lexical trigger may be 
particularly hard to identify (Simner & Haywood, 2009). Yet it is easy to guess why a native 
English speaker might see yellow in the letter Y (or a French speaker in J), and blue in B (French 
too), although seeing brown in D is harder to puzzle out without knowing more details of the 
individual synesthete’s cultural background.  
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Basis in biology and society 
This striking phenomenon illustrates how neither a neural basis nor a cultural basis can stand 
on its own in psychological development. Neurogenetic expression and linguistic education 
interact in early life to select contrasts among material and symbolic affordances of 
environmental entities. Idiosyncratic development of those feature identifying processes accounts 
for synesthesia and other unusual sorts of crossmodal integration, alongside the unremarkable 
integration of abilities and experiences that underpins everything that we do.  
A variety of evidence indicates that the source of synesthesia is an unusually configured 
norm acquired early in life. Synesthesia like effects can be acquired in adulthood, but these may 
be the potentiation or specialisation of features in universally long established multimodal 
norms. Instances of synesthesia in a dramatic form are relatively rare (Rich et al., 2005). It has 
been claimed however that such crossmodal effects are common for odors (Stevenson & 
Tomiczek, 2007; Stevenson, Rich & Russell, 2012). Generic theory of biosocial mental 
development can account for the acquisition of widespread crossmodally configured 
generalization, as well as extreme synesthesia in special circumstances.  
Some common forms of cross-modal integration might be regarded as illusory and yet they 
can be accounted for as re-integration of differentiated features. For example, the locating of a 
food aroma in the mouth rather than the nose could result from the integration of olfactory, 
gustatory, and spatial (tactile and conceptual) information into the identification of the food 
actually present inside the mouth (Lim & Johnson, 2012; Rozin, 1982). Thirst-quenching 
properties are attributed to the colors of drinks which vary in acidity (Labbe, Almiron-Roig, 
Hudry et al., 2009). In part at least, this could be color-food name mediated form of lexical-
gustatory synesthesia (Simner & Haywood, 2009).  It has been proposed that this norm of 
perceived water repletion includes tactile information from the saliva that continues to be 
secreted after the swallowing of acid (French, Read, Booth & Arkley, 1993).  
Within the biological system underlying a mind, excitatory connections among neurons in 
cerebral cortex are initially random on a universally inhibitory background. As cortex grows, 
connections survive or become less inhibited that are selected by patterns of muscular 
contraction or sensory receptor stimulation, and the motor- sensory correlations (Spector & 
Maurer, 2009). Both increases and decreases of connectivity are supported by the evidence, and 
in theory an appropriate balance increases the efficiency of a learning network (Kados, Henik & 
Walsh, 2009). There is now evidence from the formation of shape-color associations for such a 
neural basis for synesthesia at 2-3 months of age which has gone by 8 months (Wagner & 
Dobkins, 2011). 
In an analogous way, within the cultural system at a mind’s social basis, the morphemes of a 
language adapt over history (ter Hark, 2006). Words change in use without confusion about 
concepts. As a result of such changes at the individual level, the performance and 
phenomenology of intentions and percepts become increasingly specific, both analytically to 
distinct features and integrated for each identified entity. For example, if all edible orange 
colored objects had the smell, taste and texture of the citrus fruit, an orange, and all sweet and 
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sour, fruity smelling and citrus textured objects had the color orange, then orange color might 
come to taste sour and sweet and/or any material that tasted strongly sweet and sour might look 
orange in color. This outcome would be modulated by exposure to yellow or green citrus fruit, 
such as lemons or limes. Most cases of color-taste and color-odor synesthesia do indeed appear 
to be based on longstanding experience of foods (Spence, Levitan, Shankar & Zampini, 2010; 
Zampini, Sanabria, Phillips & Spence, 2007). 
Nevertheless, distinct biological or social factors could channel the development of some 
forms of synesthesia. It has been claimed that it may be especially easy for odor to evoke the 
learned configural norm because of that modality’s uniquely wide initial connections around the 
brain (Stevenson & Tomiczek, 2007). It has been pointed out that regions of the brain critical to 
the perception of colors and words may be more richly interconnected than other pairs of 
modalities because they are next to each other, although this suggestion is challenged by the 
differing localisations of perceived and synesthetically experienced color (Hupe, Bordier & 
Dojat, 2012). Incidence of synesthesia running in families has been taken to point to genetic 
factors, but the potential importance of shared environment should not be discounted. The 
linguistic and material culture clearly is important to some of the specific features that are 
associated in synesthesia, such as sequences of symbols like 1 to 7 and the names of the first, 
second or seventh day of the week (Rich et al., 2005).  
According to early systematic work, a major characteristic of synesthesia is that it is 
unidirectional (Cytowic, 1995). That would require some extraneous constraint on the formation 
of a configured norm. For example, a common form of synesthesia is a color evoked by the 
reading of a letter or the hearing of a musical sound; it would be rare to hear a word  or read a 
piece of music while viewing a color. Nevertheless a case of word-taste synesthesia in both 
directions has been described in detail (Richer, Beaufils & Poirer, 2011). Perhaps subtler effects 
in associative learning are involved, such as latent learning or blocking by pre-exposure. 
Alternatively or as well, unidirectional effects might arise from a difference in salience between 
the features in the norms for the usual context for each feature. 
Discrimination analysis of the synesthetic norm 
Potentially subconscious processes in synesthesia have been explored using a Stroop 
technique (Mills, Boteler & Oliver, 1999).  As with the IAT discussed earlier (Greenwald et al., 
1998), discrimination analysis could give more precise information at the start, in less time for 
the participant and the investigator.  
An outline design for a case of letter-color synesthesia might vary categorical features of the 
trigger, e.g. E with F, L, I, -, = and =, plus a square-cornered 8 and a vertical rectangle, perhaps 
scaled as number of features added or omitted. Ratings of distances from evoked hue of test 
patches of different hues could serve as a response.  The discrimination between numbers of 
features by variation in wavelength could be used the characterize interactions between features 
of the letter E in the color experienced.   
Other features of the trigger or the concurrent could be assessed and interacted, such as 
adjacency in the alphabet or saturation of the color. The hypothesized norm could be tested by 
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adding features that were not part of the synesthesia, such as shape of the colored object and 
words conceptually related to the word hypothesized to contain the triggering letter. 
Development of a biosocial mental life 
Lifelong development of a person’s causal systems  
Mental development throughout life can be analyzed as the building of the causal 
connections within an individual’s discriminative norms to be better afforded by the social and 
material environment. In recent decades there has been a remarkable acceleration of advances in 
many areas of the behavioral and cognitive sciences, neuroscience and organismic bioscience, 
anthropology and other social sciences, and related areas of philosophy. Yet these specialized 
disciplines, separately and together, have struggled with limited success to construct realistic 
accounts of the relations between mind and brain, or of the interfacing of individuals’ activities 
and supra-personal communal processes. Two misuses of the concept of causation still slow the 
growth of a coherent body of knowledge about the achievements of an embodied and 
acculturated mental life.   
One of these misconceptions is that mind and brain interact causally or relate in any lawful 
way. The alternative presented in this paper is that the distinctive causation within a mind 
develops throughout life in conjunction with the material causation that extends over the external 
environment, the body and the brain, and the social causation by which human communities 
work. None of these three types of causation, nor some fourth type, interconnects the social, 
material and mental systems. That is, minds, societies and the physical universe are equally real 
(a neutrally monistic ontology) but require separate sorts of empirical investigation and 
explanation (a systems pluralist epistemology; cp. Psillos, 2008).  
The other confusion is searching for a causal account of development. There is no cause-
effect mechanism for the development of a new capacity. The explanation rests in novel 
exploitation of pre-existing capacities. The placing of a seed in the earth does not cause the plant 
to grow and flower. The planting permits that member of the species to exploit the affordances of 
the soil, rain, air and sunlight by the causal processes that are operative at a particular time 
during its development. Each stage in a plant’s growth is characterized by a distinctive network 
of causation, not by the current state of the plant’s appearance, genome or ecology, nor by a 
discrete set of influences from the previous stage.  
In other words, the interdisciplinary science of development is itself non-causal. This fact 
has sometimes led to the development of a human individual being regarded as fundamentally 
mysterious. It is unquestionable that minds come into being. Yet it explains nothing to claim 
merely that the mental emerges from the non-mental. Some account is needed of how mental 
processes grow out of social and biological processes within the individual. 
Unitary growth of embodiment, sociality and mind 
We bring up, nourish and educate our offspring intuitively, as our biological and societal 
ancestry has enabled us to do. The successful development of an intelligent robot, in contrast, has 
to be explicit about the social context, the hardware and the software that permit the machine to 
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perform. Nevertheless, the digital programs run autonomously, both on the hardware used in 
central processing and memory, and also in the functioning of the engineered entity within 
human society (Cangelosi, Metta, Sagerer et al., 2010). Equally, psychological development of a 
natural individual is not determined or explained by the operations of the wetware of the brain or 
by the social activities of carers and educators, nor by both together.  
Rather, the development of a child, or a socially and physically competent robot, builds on 
the communal and interpersonal functions of the individual’s outputs and inputs in word and 
gesture, and on the physics and physiology of the effectors and sensors. None of this is beyond 
the relevant sciences, so long as they are integrated in ways appropriate to understanding the 
development of each particular unity of multiple systems. 
Ontogenesis is the classic term in biology for the development of an individual organism. 
However, that is a purely descriptive concept, encompassing the beginning of any sort of living 
entity. A stronger term is needed to convey the development of a human person, and of any other 
animal or machine that proves to be intelligently social. From conception onwards, genomics and 
culture interact to generate an increasingly autonomous contributor to the biology of the species 
and the culture of the community (Tomasello &Vaish, 2013). The term autopoiesis has been 
suggested for the development of an engineered or biological self-operating system (Maturana & 
Varela, 1980; Varela, Thompson & Rosch, 1991). Another word might be preferable for the 
much more open-ended development of a person. Autogony literally means self-seeding. That 
botanical metaphor emphasizes the cycle of sprouting, flowering and reproduction. It also 
conveys something of the efficacy and part independence of the developed individual, together 
with the dependence on the germline and the local ecology. Furthermore, autogonic development 
continues throughout a human life. Not only is the boy child the father of the man; the young 
man is also the father of the senior citizen, through both environment and genes (Ronald, 2011).  
In another metaphor, a mind is sculpted by interactions between genomics and upbringing 
but that mind increasingly becomes partly self-sculpting. This is not a merely cosmetic operation 
either. The development of autonomy goes to the center of the person’s being (Christman, 1991; 
Wolf, 1980; cp. Baer, Kaufman & Baumeister, 2008). Habits help to form the individual’s 
dispositions. New thoughts about challenging situations may become some of that person’s own 
pervasive reasons for action. Without some degree of autonomy from genes and environment, 
there is no scope for an adult to improve, or for fully successful therapy or rehabilitation of 
someone with serious problems. Cognitive development is lifelong learning.   
Developing development science 
Non-causal explanation 
It is increasingly recognized that individual psychological development needs special sorts 
of scientific explanation (Karmiloff-Smith, 1998, 2007; Karmiloff-Smith, D’Souza, Dekker et 
al., 2012; Musolino & Landau, 2012; Thomas, Karamenis & Knowland, 2010). Most such work 
has so far been at an intermediate level of explanation (Hernandez & Blazer, 2006). Distinctive 
phenomena have been identified. Lifelong interactions of genes and environs (both misconceived 
as causes) in behavior (misconceived as the phenotypic effect) appear to be channeled or 
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modularized. Sometimes the same capacity develops from multiple routes. Such convergence is 
well known in biological evolution, such as the camera eye, echolocation and many examples in 
DNA and protein sequences (Conway Morris, 2005). An example in mental development might 
be starting to read by phonics alone or word outlines alone. Once the ability to read has matured, 
both of the original decoding skills are exploited as the task requires of the individual.  
A mature science of development will have a specific explanation for the emergence of each 
particular capacity or incapacity in the individual. Clearly a lot of work has to be done to bring 
together genomics and the analysis of environmental impact for any condition or competence. 
Genetic-psychometric survey research complements experimental designs that capture both 
genetic and environmental variables. That combination can produce surprises. The education-
health gradient turns out to arise primarily from traits of temperament rather than habitual 
cognitive-behavioral processes (Conti & Heckman, 2010). In some developmental disorders, 
cognitive deficits are often genetic, while physical deficits are often environmental, rather than 
the other way round as might have been expected (Bishop, 2006).  
Usually neither genetic nor environmental determinism is plausible for disorders of mental 
development. Vulnerability to a disorder comes from a background of interactions among 
biological and social factors. Interactions between single genes and discrete stressors can be 
identified when statistical designs are sufficiently sophisticated (McArdle & Prescott, 2010). 
Examples include some of the syndromes picked out by the anecdotal technique of psychiatric 
diagnosis (Caspi, Hariri, Holmes et al., 2010; Mandelli, Serretti, Marino et al., 2007). For 
instance, infants with the some gene polymorphisms in neurotransmitter systems associated with 
affective disorders have difficulty in disengaging as soon as most others can from the highly 
emotive signals which some receive, such as a threatening movement of a face or limb by a carer 
(Holmboe, Nemoda, Fearon et al., 2010;  Leppänen, Peltola, Puura et al., 2011).  
Science from scenarios 
The key to full explanation of a dysfunction or of a specific capacity is quantitative 
characterization of its operation in individuals on particular occasions. Causal analysis of an 
individual’s episode within a scenario is a precision tool for tracking back the content of that 
biosocial exchange to its start. Much of the work of this sort so far has been limited by reliance 
on multi-item psychometric scales. Analysis of the causation operative at a particular stage in 
development requires experimental tests that simulate actual situations encompassed by the 
single question items in such scales. As always in norm-zeroed discrimination analysis, the 
outputs and the inputs can be either material or symbolic. Claims that verbal data are unreliable, 
still made by those who insist on apparently physical responses to physical stimuli, have long 
since been refuted (Ericsson & Simon, 1993).  
An example of how question items could be developed into scenarios is a scale of symptoms 
of impaired sating of appetite for food that has been developed for use with sufferers from the 
Prader-Willi syndrome (PWS) of developmental incapacity (Russell & Oliver, 2003). This defect 
in the expression of a gene often leads to obesity, which results at least in part from difficulty in 
ending a bout of eating, appearing at about 2 years of age (Holm, Cassidy, Butler et al., 1993). A 
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phenotype of insensitivity to physiological signals remains to be identified, although 
abnormalities have been reported in hormones related to appetite for food (Haqq, Stadler, 
Rosenfeld et al., 2003). In PWS and some other types of genetically influenced intellectual 
disability, there is clear sensitivity of eating and other affected behavior to social signals (Oliver, 
Horsler, Berg et al., 2007). A developmental pathway though interactions between genetic and 
environmental influences on cognition has been proposed (Woodcock, Oliver & Humphreys, 
2009a,b). The satiety scale’s questions include how often the individual spontaneously performs 
the tasks of saying I feel full or I still feel hungry, or of eating more than a standard sized meal.  
In order to analyze the mental causation that operates during answers to each or all of these 
question items, one or two typical contexts for such performance need to be identified, together 
with the key stimulus and response features in the material and social environment. For instance, 
vignettes of the finish of the main course of a common meal could vary the amounts of major 
components such as potatoes and meat (Booth, 2008b; Santos, 1998), how many other people 
were at the table (De Castro, 1997), and any other factors hypothesized to be important. For each 
described variant of the scenario, the sufferer or a proven empathic carer would rate likely 
momentary strength of a sensation of stretch, frequency of pangs of hunger, and size of an 
additional portion accepted. The rated responses could use vocabulary elicited from sufferers for 
their thoughts, emotions and desires, about themselves, others and the foods in such a situation. 
The contribution from each feature to each response can be measured by norm-zeroed 
discrimination scaling. The resulting greater specificity of characterization of the impairment can 
be exploited therapeutically. Also, its initial appearance and environmental dependency (e.g. 
Woodcock et al., 2009b) can be tracked back for preventive purposes. Physical and social 
simulation of the ending of the meal in experimental designs could measure the strength of effect 
of hormonal actions, a message from a carer, or other experimental variable (cp. Booth, O’Leary 
et al., 2011). 
Most obesity is polygenic and ecologically diverse, unlike PWS. In Western data from the 
middle of the twentieth century, genetic influences on fatness (or leanness) were most strongly 
expressed in late childhood (Bouchard, Perusse, LeBlanc et al., 1988).  Considerable attention is 
currently being paid to the actions of primary carers in early childhood (Birch, Fisher, Grimm-
Thomas et al., 2001). A number of the items in these research questionnaires refer to particular 
patterns of parental action affecting the child. Examples include keeping certain foods out of the 
house (which may have been done before having the child) and speech or action at the table 
attempting to change the child’s eating.  Experimental work could be more productive if designs 
were based on similarities to common situations, not just artificial tests of abstract concepts 
based on psychometric scale scores.   
In adulthood, limited autonomy can be exercised under continuing genetic and 
environmental influences in the acceptance or refusal of specific types of food or drink on 
particular occasions, and of opportunities to sit or to walk. Change in choice for reasons of 
physical health and/or psychological wellbeing may initially be effortful but, as the new norm 
becomes more precisely afforded by perceived options, read-out into intention can become 
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automatic. The key issue for control of weight is the net effect on exchange of energy between 
the individual’s body and the environment that results from a sustained change in frequency and 
intensity of a particular pattern of eating, exercise or heat-loss control (Blair, Booth, Lewis & 
Wainwright, 1989).  Once that effectiveness of each commonly maintained pattern has been 
measured, it becomes critical to know how each change in pattern, supported by that evidence, 
can become sufficiently automatic to minimize effortful demand on working memory (Baer et 
al., 2008; Lally, Van Jaarsveld, Potts & Wardle, 2010; Lally, Wardle & Gardner, 2011). 
Scenarios of common lapses from weight-reducing habits within prevalent material and social 
cultures need to be characterized (Carels, Douglass, Cacciapaglia & O'Brien, 2004). Then the 
multimodal norm and relative strengths of locally conceptualized environmental factors can be 
measured in each typical instance of lapsing. That provides the lacking evidence base for both 
personal and socioeconomic action to reduce and prevent unhealthy long term fatness (Booth & 
Booth, 2011; Laguna-Camacho, Nouwen & Booth, under review).  
The same principles apply to all recurrent activities that have been shown to improve 
wellbeing or to reduce distress. Life often brings increased involvement in distinct social and 
material subcultures, including their ‘dialects’ (D’Andrade, 1995).  
Development as learning  
The above overview implies that a basic strategy for the science of development is to 
identify causal processes that are added when performance changes. This strategy can work even 
when the change looks like a new stage in development. A single additional process can result in 
a qualitative change in overall performance. Added discrete processes can be sought by 
comparing observational protocols as soon as possible before and after the change. If mature 
performance can be explained as a combination of separate causal processes, one or two of those 
transformations of input into output might be sufficient to account for the earliest performance of 
that sort. 
That approach at first sight may seem to ignore structural change during development. 
However, a great variety of developed psychological structures, including stages of cognitive 
growth, have turned out to result from the addition of a further working component to an already 
functioning set of discrete processes. It takes more than sealing a roof onto an open boat to turn it 
into a good submarine. Nonetheless, that might be an adequate start.  
Whatever the overall structure of a system at any time, there remains the challenge of 
specifying the components used in its realization. The borderline between architecture and well 
fitting building blocks is unlikely to be hard and fast. It is a questionable strategy to specify 
architecture first, because supposedly essential structure has so often dissolved into adapted 
elements. On the other hand, the attempt to make an initial architectural sketch may help to 
narrow down options for what the building blocks have to do.  
A distinction should be drawn between a simple and uniform type of element in a developing 
system and what development can do by putting together specific versions of that element which 
are adapted to the environment in the service of the whole system’s performance. The general 
concept of a discrete causal function transforming incoming information into outgoing 
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information is sufficient to allow the output from one particular element to be coordinated to the 
input to another specified element, as guided by outputs from and inputs to the whole system. 
For human development, the capacity for such covert input/output functions has to be immense, 
in the mind, in the brain and in communal systems such as language. Learning is selection of the 
activity in such elements that achieves overt input-output transforms which can cope with the 
current environment, and may even conquer it.  
Measuring development 
In this approach, the measurement of development relies on tracking back the mental 
processing from the emergence of a new competence to the latest period of its absence. An 
individual’s psychological development is analyzed as a succession of added competences. First, 
the performance that has just become possible is characterized from systematic observation.  
Then differences are identified between that new mental processing and the causation of related 
performance before the competence was acquired. The search for potential precursors may be 
more difficult than initially specifying tests of the new competence. The hard graft of 
developmental psychology is designing investigations that rule a candidate precursor out or in.  
Once a difference between new and old competence has been identified, the norms involved 
can be characterized in more detail by multi-thetic discrimination scaling. This approach 
complements the classic sequence in developmental psychology of identifying an experimental 
phenomenon and then exploring the abilities that comprise it by testing single general hypotheses 
one at a time. Psychological experiments are often designed merely to demonstrate effects that 
are expected (or not) from a theory that under-specifies the mental mechanisms involved, 
because relationships between inputs and outputs have not been measured and analyzed.   
The characterization of causal elements differing between new and prior processing 
identifies biological and communal affordances that accommodate the step in development. 
Hence a novel interaction between the genome and the ecology might be uncovered by use of 
norm-zeroed discrimination. Interactions already identified from other evidence could be 
substantiated with full situational specificity, as illustrated earlier. 
The approach is highly consonant with several existing lines of evidence regarding cognitive 
development. Computational approaches have made important contributions.  First we shall 
consider list processing programs.  Then a view of connectionist models will be expounded. 
Systems of condition-act routines 
The early days of artificial intelligence provided some remarkable examples of apparent 
change in cognitive structure that was explicable as the addition of a new causal process to an 
already working set of discrete mental mechanisms. The use of scenarios to collect theoretically 
interpretable anecdotes was crucial to these discoveries.   
Piaget (1954, 1970) understood steps in cognitive growth to be changes in mental structure.  
However, the apparent structural changes between Piagetian stages can be explained as the 
addition of well adapted routines. Each of these routines converts perceived circumstances into 
an intention to manipulate the situation in a specific way. Children’s solutions to many of the 
problems that Piaget set to measure the present stage of development can be explained by 
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collections of small numbers of separate routines (Klahr, Langley & Neches, 1987). The set of 
routines forms a system when the execution of one routine changes environmental affordances in 
a way that triggers another routine on the list. Cognitive structure is created by the adaption of 
outputs and inputs between routines, back to the initial conditions of the problem and forward to 
the actions of a complete solution. Extraneous structure may be imposed so that the system 
resolves conflicts between routines, such as when incompatible actions are triggered by the same 
state of the world, two routines oscillate by creating the circumstances that trigger each other, or 
there is more than one problem to be solved. Nevertheless the main architectural framework is 
inherent to the routines. 
For instance, one of Piaget’s tasks is to put a jumble of rods into a row of steadily decreasing 
length. The movements of children at different stages of solving this problem of length seriation 
were carefully observed and a detailed simulation of performance at each stage was built from a 
small number of specific actions in particular circumstances (Young, 1976). Just one extra 
routine accounted for the shift from an earlier to a later stage. Later work showed that two-thirds 
of the errors that children made in subtracting one number from another could be explained by 
their omission of a routine, or their insertion of a routine from another arithmetical task (Young 
& O’Shea, 1981). 
These routines are one sort of re-write rule in computer programming. Each rule can 
simulate a real system’s transition from one state to another. The transitions can be placed in a 
highly structured recursive network, for example to parse the grammar of an ordinary sentence 
from its start to its finish (Thorne, Bratley & Dewar, 1968; Woods, 1970).  Nevertheless, 
environmentally adaptive structure can emerge from an active network when it has no pre-set 
sequencing. For example, a hierarchical structure of activation has been proposed for the diverse 
types of motivation in sets of particular actions (Hinde, 1969). Nevertheless, the same overall 
performance can be achieved by a single layer of elements that spread activation to each other, 
but with deletions of connections keeping apart the groups of output (Ludlow, 1976). The basic 
mechanism of output from one information transfer function serving as input to another transfer 
function has been generalized in a determinate mathematics that has many applications in 
computing and the natural sciences (Petri & Reisig, 2008) and is consistent with the 
indeterminacies in quantum physics (’t Hooft, 2002). 
Learning of responses to stimuli 
Associative conditioning 
The addition of an adaptive information transfer function is a form of learning in the most 
general sense of that term. The input conditions correspond to a cue to the successful outcome of 
an act in response. That is, the development of a new routine is analogous to learning of a 
conditioned response to a conditional stimulus, or of a stimulus which is specific to a response 
that is followed by reinforcement. Such learning is investigated by comparing the performance of 
responses to stimuli before and after training.  The tradition of research into associative 
processes during learning has focused on changes of performance when contingencies in the 
environment are changed. Cognitive development is equivalent insofar as it can be characterized 
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as increased sensitivity to a contingency that was already present. In this way, growth in 
competence might be explicable as the acquisition of discrete learned processes. 
Doubts about this approach would be justified if the learnt processes were physiological 
reflexes or responses compelled by biological reinforcers. However, these concepts are 
misattributions to Pavlov (1927/1960) and Skinner (1953) respectively (cp. Rescorla & Solomon, 
1967). Pavlov started as a physiologist studying reflexes but he discovered that learning was 
necessary to account for the dependence of the reflex response on the context in which it had 
previously been elicited. The official materialism in post-revolutionary Russia required Pavlov to 
refer to the mind as higher nervous processes, and to the new responses to stimuli as connections 
between cortical centers. American behaviorism had its own materialist ontology which persists 
in use of the term ‘response’ to equivocate between a pattern of muscular contractions and an 
action for a reason (Guthrie, 1940; cp., van Dantzig, Pecher & Zwaan, 2008) and using 
‘stimulus’ to conflate physical stimulation of sensors with the mental processes of sensing and 
perceiving (Hamlyn, 1957). Skinner sought to avoid those errors by operationally defining 
reinforcement as any consequence of a response that changes subsequent responding of that sort. 
Hence, reinforcers include broader goals, such as competence itself, and objectives inferred by 
practical reasoning (prudential or ethical). Such a position becomes incoherent only when it is 
denied that response-reinforcer relationships are processed by the individuals whose responses 
are reinforced. Responsible actions are caused by the person’s own reasons, such as the belief 
that particular events are likely to follow a specific action in certain circumstances. That is a 
freedom which can be dignified without requiring some extraneous owner to pull the rational 
agent’s strings. 
Equally, however, learning theorists for their part should acknowledge that improvement in 
performance, especially in ecologically valid investigations, may come from adaptation of 
previously existing learned structure, rather than de novo. If learning is seen as the updating of 
previously developed structure, there is less disparity between associationism and traditional 
analysis of development.  
Unfortunately, however, more flexible programming languages and increased computing 
power have led to the theoretical degeneracy that also afflicts psychophysical laws and non-
metric modeling of response patterns in object recognition. Both the structured lists of adapted 
routines and the parallel processing in randomly connected and non-linearly recursive networks 
have been shown to develop performance as sophisticated as the perceptual learning of natural 
scenes and the semantic interpretation of human language (Anderson & Matessa, 1997; Greene 
& Oliva, 2009; Rumelhart, McClelland & the PDP Research Group, 1987; Suppes, 1968). Yet 
what has been learned is so opaque in connectionist models that the basic scientific task of 
testing a specific theoretical explanation is ignored.  
Uses of language built from conditioned responses 
It has been questioned in philosophy whether there is fundamental difference between a dog 
learning a specific act in response to a verbal command and an infant first coming to understand 
what a word refers to (Harrison, 1972).  My dog may learn to bring me the correct object 
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whether I say Fetch me your ball or Where is your bone? A 7 month old infant showed his 
understanding of the word ‘milk’ when his mother called out unprompted from another room 
about his drink of milk, by turning to face the cupful that had been placed on the shelf behind 
him (Booth, 1978a). This example illustrates how the accumulation of anecdotes could constrain 
theorizing at least as much as the performance of a succession of conventionally designed tests. 
The dog has been more or less formally trained. Yet the same environmental contingencies 
are set up in the informal naming game. It need never have been played with that infant, 
however, nor any encouragement given to attend to words for objects. The infant turning to face 
the object illustrates how naming can be based on non-linguistic and even non-symbolic 
behavior. Eye gaze and head turning can be purely stimulus driven movements. Furthermore 
sight of such a directed movement is a material affordance to looking at a somewhere on another 
individual’s line of gaze. Sight of the object can be configured with sound of the word. Indeed, 
frequency of pointing is correlated across individuals with size of vocabulary early in the second 
year (Esseily, Jacquet & Fagard, 2011).  
Naming has been claimed to be central also to the historical development of language in 
human culture (Hurford, 1989; Steels, 1997). Nevertheless use of names is only a small part of 
the workings of language. The picture theory of meaning does not work, even for names 
(Wittgenstein, 1953). We use words successfully in many other tasks besides stating what is the 
case (Austin, 1962).  
It has been argued recently that learning is based on propositions rather than associations (De 
Houwer, 2009). This controversy may arise from insufficient distinction between material and 
symbolic inputs and outputs, rather than from the nature of the causal processes by which an 
individual connects patterns of information. Animals without language can acquire ‘cognitive 
maps’ symbolizing their spatial environment (Tolman, 1948), although that interpretation of 
observed performance has been questioned (Bennett, 1996). An overall associationist account of 
spatial learning has been constructed (Pearce, 2009). Discrimination scaling shows that 
differences between material and symbolic stimuli do not bear on the causal processes 
themselves that convert the past and current information into ongoing overt and covert outputs.  
Building a norm 
Perception and memory 
We have seen that norms do not drive perception and intention 'top-down' any more, or less, 
than stimuli and responses drive working memory 'bottom-up.' The norm that is active in an 
individual at any given moment resides in the content of working memory that is afforded by the 
present environment. The situation may select a matching norm -- that is, one sharing the 
features that are currently salient. Alternatively, only some less appropriate norms may be 
available. Processing of such a partly unfamiliar situation may combine existing norms into a 
new norm or adapt an inadequate norm to be more nearly appropriate in its features and their 
zero settings (norm points).  Indeed, a norm is liable to refinement at any time, in its feature 
categories and their discrimination units and norm points. 
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In other words, long-term memory is not an unchanging archive, nor is ongoing perception a 
flux with no history. The use of past information in the present processing of perception and 
action is liable to change what is available in working memory on future occasions. False 
memories can be created (Loftus & Hoffman, 1989; Loftus, Miller & Burns, 1978) or avoided 
(Knibb & Booth, 2011), depending on how the individual and the cultural and material 
affordances are allowed to interact. What we call working memory is the running of the most 
recently learned version of the norm though sensing, conceiving, perception, emotion, intention 
and thought, thereby updating parameters of the norm. Daydreaming and dreams while asleep 
run recently active norms without sensing or action. A connection becoming active creates a new 
past for later activation. The re-used adapting connections are re-consolidated over time (Figure 
12) but without at any stage preventing some further use by ongoing perception and intention 
(Kesner & Conner, 1974; Lee, 2008; Lewis, 1979; Zinkin & Miller, 1967). Conscious or 
unconscious remembering is the extraction of information from the past by activity in potentially 
relevant established pathways.   
Figure 12 about here 
Associative bases 
The building of each norm for intention and/or emotion in a particular situation can be 
explained in terms of known phenomena in associative learning. The addition of a stimulus or 
response feature to a norm, the setting of the norm value, and the discriminative slope (Weber 
fraction) of each feature, all have parallels in the conditioning of responses to stimuli (Pavlov, 
1927/1960).   
The core of the strengthening of features is the learning of a response to a quantitative 
feature. This prerequisite is distinguishing a difference between categories from identity in 
category (Wasserman & Young, 2010).  With the category of the conditioned stimulus, however, 
usually a single level is presented during training such as the hue of a light or the pitch of a 
sound. The learned response is at a peak of vigor and probability at that level of the stimulus but 
declines on either side. The position of the peak and the slope of its sides are altered by omitting 
reward from a stimulus of the same category at a different level nearby. The peak moves away 
from the unrewarded level. The side of the rewarded peak nearer the punished level becomes 
steeper than the side further away.  This can result from summation: the nearer side has 
increasing inhibition subtracted from the facilitation, making it steeper, while any inhibition 
subtracted from the farther side decreases, thereby flattening the slope if anything (Bloomfield, 
1967; Ghirlanda & Enquist, 2007). 
Unfortunately such work on quantities of the learned stimulus has been neglected in favor of 
categorical stimuli. Nevertheless the basic idea of associative processes accounting for the 
acquisition of a response to a stimulus has been extended sufficiently to provide an account of 
each element of a norm  as a response controlled by a stimulus, functioning reactively as to 
Pavlov’s conditioned stimulus or with intention as to B.F. Skinner’s discriminative stimulus. 
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Bases of the norm in the culture and the brain  
Neglect of the developmental history of an individual’s mental causation can lead to serious 
weaknesses in integrative neuroscience and in cultural analysis. Hence the relations of the 
workings of the mind to those of either the brain or the culture remain sketchy at best. Ambitious 
proposals for systematic integration of neuroscience with applied social science disciplines such 
as education or marketing (e.g., Fischer, Daniel, Immordino-Yang et al., 2007; Revoisé & Morin, 
2007) seem highly unrealistic without concrete theory of biosocial mental development based on 
evidence from norm-zeroed discrimination in real situations.   
The first step is relating psychology to neuroscience or to social research is to acknowledge 
that the learnt norms are distributed through the brain and body and through the material and 
cultural environs (Booth, 1978b; Clark, 2008).   
Sensory receptors do not activate labeled lines into the brain: they extract information that 
selects its own channels over the real neural networks as specified by current read-out from a 
norm, or multiple norms (McDermott & Roediger, 1994; Rauss, Schwartz & Pourtois, 2011).  
The norm for the flavor of a food, for example, is widely distributed through at least temporal, 
frontal and cingulate regions of cortex (Small & Green, 2012).  Motor pools for muscle 
contractions are activated by the intention norms best matched by current sensory input and other 
motor output (Bays & Wolpert, 2007; Thakur, Bastian & Hsiao, 2008). Adaptive synapses are 
distributed as low as needed in sensory afferent pathways (Gilbert & Li, 2012) and the efferents 
to the spinal motor neurons (Wang, Pillai, Wolpaw & Chen, 2006). 
For example, theories of visual object “maintenance” turn out to under-specify both the 
neural mechanisms and the environmental conditions (Caplovitz et al., 2011).  That however is 
in the nature of a psychological theory. The issue is whether the conscious and unconscious 
mental processes have been adequately specified. 
Similarly, the norms for both symbolic and material entities are often highly delocalized in 
space and time. A particular act by a person at a time and place comes from the individual’s life 
story and the history of family and wider society. An item of food is invested by a cuisine 
dependent on traditions of agriculture, manufacture, cooking practices, nutritional science and 
media dissemination. It has been argued that psychological research itself has norms distributed 
across institutions such as academic subdepartments, books, journals and conferences that are 
dedicated to supposed sections of the mind, preventing integrated work on any of the domains of 
daily life for which the norms are built (Rozin, 2006). 
Specification of the stimuli 
A psychophysical approach to object recognition exposes lack of attention to actual 
influences on the observed responses. The effective features of the test stimuli are grossly 
underspecified in terms of the effects of the materials that the individual has learned to 
recognize. This is illustrated by work on learning about foods and the consequent features of 
perceptual categories in action on food.  The result is serious misunderstandings about the 
mechanisms by which influences over eating develop and operate, such as sensory preferences 
and satiety physiology.   For examples, choices among food were attributed to their nutrient 
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contents, when the only information available to the chooser was the sensed characteristics 
which bear no direct relationship to the starch, protein or fat in a food (Booth & Thibault, 2000). 
Furthermore sensory influences on choice are part of the learned norms for eating in that bodily 
and social context (Booth, 1985, 2008b, 2009).  So far from flavor and texture providing unlearnt 
reward or pleasure, built into the genes, each configuration of color, odor, taste and touch is an 
associatively conditioned incentive (Berridge & Robinson, 2003; Booth, 1985), guiding selection 
in accord with distance of the piece of food from the individual’s norm.     
Cultural basis of learning 
It has been argued that understanding of the mind depends on the analysis of culture and of 
symbolic communication in particular (Coulter, 1978; Garfinkel, 1967; Forgas, 1982). 
Approaches vary from solipsistic interpretation of text to the mechanics of political persuasion. 
In either case, we will only understand language if we also understand the basic principles of 
what is going on in the mind of an ordinary reader, hearer, speaker, writer and other creator of 
art, and indeed of a scholar constructing an interpretation of a political event, literary material or 
a piece of graphic art. 
Paradoxically, many scholars of culture have developed a blindness to culture, both the 
possibility of academic agreement and disagreement, and also the wider society that makes 
narrative, not mere markings or sounds (D’Andrade, 1995). The lone scholar’s own 
interpretation is treated as the sole reality. Presupposition of any reality to be investigated, 
whether social, physical or mental, is said to be the evil of ‘science’ – or, more precisely, of 
scientism on the model of 17th century physics. The position is impervious to arguments that it is 
paradoxical. Quite apart from life outside academic deskwork, the text to be interpreted is an 
existence proof of a reality that constrains interpretation, whether or not there is an author.  
Many examples of personal development show mutual informing of individual and culture.  
As the individual begins to gain independence from familial environment and genes, widely 
available objects and practices are adopted, inducing new norms. The societal mechanisms of 
supply and demand create a fashion or establish an enduring change, depending on the numbers 
who maintain activities in accord with the new norm (Acerbi, Ghirlanda & Enquist, 2012). More 
fundamentally, every use of a language that adapts a personal norm is liable to change that aspect 
of the language. The same goes for every other living social institution. 
The symbolic processing through which an individual accommodates cultural affordances is 
unlikely to be distinctively human. It may be deeply rooted in the brains of animals that currently 
lack any evident culture shared with their conspecifics. For example, propositional mechanisms 
of learning have been contrasted with associative accounts in other species as well as ours (De 
Houwer, 2009; Lovibond, 2003). The propositions claimed to control learned performance are 
representations of the contingences between events (e.g., causal beliefs), rather than direct inputs 
from events that are causally related. Experimenters who get evidence for propositional learning 
in non-human subjects (including intelligent machines) are making a fragmentary start on their 
historical domestication into human culture.   
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Neural bases of learning 
It is widely claimed that we will only understand the mind if we understand the brain. The 
explanation of private experience, in particular, is supposed to come from better understanding 
of neural activity. It is unclear, though, whether that means a yet-to-be-specified structuring of 
connections between neurons or the necessary overall organization magically emerging from 
synaptic quantum mechanics. The above account of conscious processes and other types of 
mental performance implies that, to the contrary, we will only understand the brain if we 
understand the mind.  
It is becoming increasingly recognized in psychologically informed neuroscience that the 
multi-featured categories of perceived and used entities are set up and maintained by learning 
(Kourtzi & Conner, 2011, e.g. de Yong, Kourtzi & van Ee, 2012).  Hence, developmental 
neuroscience needs specifications of the mental processes of learning.  Unfortunately, we have 
long known enough about the brain to indicate that there is very little if any prospect of locating 
and characterizing particular learned connections in individuals’ brains (Booth, 1967; John, 
Bartlett, Shinokoc et al., 1973). The activity during retrieval of a particular memory would have 
to be identified in the relevant synapses by time-lagged connectivity analysis (e.g. Roebroeck, 
Formisano & Goebel, 2005), coupled with double dissociation from another memory (Henson, 
2007). An approach that might be more viable is to vary stimulus and response cues that are 
known to instigate types of processing that produce the response of interest by the individuals 
whose brain activity is monitored, and then to trace the directions of activation for features and 
integrations in that norm. At present, patterns of neural response are tracked without sufficient 
control of stimuli for analysis of the mediating mental processes that are claimed to be embodied 
in the observed neural activity (e.g., McClure, Li, Tomlin et al., 2004; Rolls, 2011). Neither oil 
nor sucrose simulates the texture of fats or tastes of sugars in foods and drinks. Creaminess and 
sweetness, for example, are features which are at zero in the diverse norms developed from 
experience of particular combinations of sensed material constituents and conceptualized cultural 
attributes of foods and drinks (Booth, 2005; Booth & Freeman, 1993; Gietzen & Aya, 2012).  
Phrenological use of imaging tells us nothing about the workings of either the brain or the 
mind. The individual’s mental performance during each brain image must be ascertained, as a 
start towards measuring doubly dissociated performance processes and directional connectivities 
(e.g., Imagoglu et al., 2012; Zhou, 2009). Then some advance might be made in understanding 
the neural networking that serves a particular aspect of mental performance, if it is identical 
across repetitions in individuals who have sufficient commonalities in their learning histories. 
For example, directional connections between cortical regions indicate that the learned incentive 
from a particular intensity of taste in a food depends on interaction between gustatory relays and 
working memory (Ge, Feng, Grabenhorst & Rolls, 2012). Such effects are tied to overall 
performance by norm-zeroed discrimination analysis (Booth, 1993; Conner et al., 1988c). 
From measurements to theories of mental development 
The above examples illustrate a wide variety of ways in which norm-zeroed discrimination 
analysis of scenarios could contribute psychological evidence that is essential to advance of the 
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science of development. It would be better to build a new line of investigation on a potentially 
illuminating anecdote from real life than on an issue generated purely within the research 
literature. Systematic observation of individual’s performance during single incidents identifies 
situations and their salient features, for categorization by members of the culture. For each major 
category of incident, inputs need to be specified that appear to vary the outputs (whether or not 
some output also affects future input). Mediating transformations identified by discrimination 
modeling can then be tracked backwards and forwards in development. 
Once an emerging mental process has been identified, questions about its basis in 
interactions between genomic expression and acculturating education can be formulated in terms 
of systems of causal processes within each individual. Such totally disaggregated findings can be 
combined and compared across appropriate subsets of individuals and situations, to generate 
fully specified generalizations and differentiations.  
Minds as they are  
The science of each mind 
Personal cognition breaks free from deeply held beliefs and practices that still constrain 
psychological research and education into the discipline. The approach addresses the nature of 
the human mind as it is, without intermediation by academic preconceptions, professional 
practices or meta-scientific commitments. Contrasts of this open-textured theory with other 
approaches were made above at the points where they are most relevant.  
Substantive theoretical content is built from evidence collected in life by the logically 
simplest instruments currently known. Further theory can be built from comparisons of the 
mental dynamics within or across individuals and within or across situations. Alternatively, 
existing psychological theory can be used to construct hypotheses about individuals and/or 
situations to test on the mental causation actually involved, as it occurs. Examples from the 
current literature have been given throughout this paper.  
Mental, physical and social causation are equally natural  
An individual develops as a plurality of distinct causal systems. That is, no causes, laws, 
entities or events within one sort of system can relate to processes in another sort of system. The 
philosophical positions that mind is an epiphenomenon of brain, mind is identical to brain, and 
brain and mind have mechanisms of interaction, are all empty scientifically. It adds nothing 
conceptual or empirical to the understanding of how a person’s mind, body and social role relate 
to each other to characterize the mind as a function or property of the brain (and body!) or as the 
exchange among individuals. The philosophical concept of supervenience of mind on brain is 
increasingly recognized as incoherent. Such ontological materialism (physicalism) dominated 
Western thought into the present century but is now in its death throes, throttled by a tangle of 
ambiguities and self-contradictions (Koons & Bealer, 2010).  
Human biology provides only a scrappy and highly speculative account of participation in 
human society by members of our species. Social science and history have generality and 
particularity that fail to mesh into a generative account of individuals. The human mind should 
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be recognized to be sui generis but as natural as the workings of social groups and of organisms 
and other entities in the material universe.  
Awareness of the self, other selves, symbolic and material realities, and one’s own 
unexpressed thoughts, images, feelings and wishes is objective achievement by an individual 
with a body and a community, as much as the mentation that comprises the performance of overt 
actions and reactions to observable situations. Private experience, in contrast, transfers those 
skills of successful engagement with reality to a relinquishing of that possibility of failure. How 
things seem explicitly carries no commitment as to how things are.  Subjective experience cannot 
be correct or incorrect. Hence it does not provide access to a non-natural world, let alone to 
certainty about any part of this material, social and mental world. What it is like to be a human 
individual is the inside view of achievements by a human mind, body and sociality.  
Conclusion 
In summary, a mind is the conscious and unconscious organizing system of the life of an 
acculturated and embodied individual. Psychology truly is the science of the soul. 
A central task for psychology in the 21st century is to find out the specifics of what is 
happening in each person, in adequate variety and numbers of instances to resolve issues of 
principle and to act effectively on problems and opportunities. Psychological research has the 
responsibility of leadership in that enterprise in both theoretical and practical arenas of human 
life, as well as the lives of members of other species, and indeed any items of socially and 
materially competent machinery that may be engineered.  
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Table 1. Cell labels for correlating quantities of two events.  Presence in Figure 3 is replaced by a 
level in a higher range (H) of Weber fraction constancy, while absence is replaced by a level in a 
lower range (L). When only two (ranges of) levels of an event are used, they should be on the 
same side of the norm in order to disambiguate the estimation of the norm point. 
 
         Event E 
 
 
    HL  HH 
Event 
    F 
           LL  LH 
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Captions to Figures (duplicated above each Figure from page 99) 
 
Figure 1.  Norm-zeroed discrimination scales. Each of the three graphs (a, b, c) shows the fit to a 
hyperbola of an individual’s judgments in a single session of disparities from preferred salt level 
(S1: sodium chloride log g / 100 g of plain white bread) in one of the participants reported by 
Booth et al., 1983 (N = 30). Salty rti (R1): the first (and only) response of saltiness relative to 
ideal (scored 0) towards unacceptably low or high in salt (-50). The participants in panels b and c 
had the maximum responses furthest from ideal and yet the fitted hyperbola (continuous line) 
still rises very close to the intersection of the tangents (broken line). The plots are output from 
the Co-Pro 2.29 tool for modelling personal cognition as described in Booth and Freeman (1993) 
and this paper.   
 
Figure 2. Unfolded quadratic (Coombs, 1964) versus theoretical hyperbola for: levels of sucrose 
(log M) in an orange-flavored drink (also varied in level of citric acid) in one session with an 
individual.  Panel a: unfolded quadratic function fitted by eye to data from Figure 5.3 in Booth 
(1994). Panel b: the same data fitted by CoPro to a hyperbola with center at zero score (see 
Figure 1). Mismatch to ideal was rated as always choose (score = 0) to never choose (-10). 
 
Figure 3. Weber’s fraction or the fractional half-discriminated disparity: (SN – SO) / SO, where 
the distributions of responses to SO and SN have superposed 75
th
 and 25
th
 percentiles, 
respectively. 
 
Figure 4. Constant concomitance supports the hypothesis that events E and F are causally related.  
Each 2 x 2 table represents a logically possible occurrence, the top row at the first observation, 
the second row at the next observation, etc. Some ambiguous possibilities are omitted from the 
second and subsequent rows. First observed pair of events: 1. Second data pair: 2. Third and 
fourth: 3, 4. 
 
Figure 5. Constant concomitance with quantitative data, covering higher and lower ranges of a 
feature of each event.  See Table 1. Numerals: sequence of presentation of stimulus levels. 
 
Figure 6. Different causal pathways (channels of information transmission) that can be diagnosed 
from a stimulus-specific response (R1) and a more integrative response (RX) to a stimulus (S1).  
S1 values are processed as distances from a norm that also includes S2 distances.  Each square is 
a type of mental event, influencing and influenced by other mental events, as indicated by 
arrows. RX may be influenced by any of the distinct stimulatory (S), conceptual (R) or 
descriptive (SR) types of mental process that use information coming from S1 and/or going to R1 
in the environment. 
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Figure 7. Types of causal processes within a mind, on one stimulus and two responses afforded 
in the environment.  Panels (a) conceptual (R), (b) descriptive (SR), (c) meaningful (SRR), (d) 
reasoning, (e) perceptual, (f) stimulatory.  
 
Figure 8.  Perceptual processes (SSR) in ratings of mixtures of MSG, salt (NaCl), sugar 
(sucrose), citric acid and caffeine in tomato juice for similarity to the taste of tomatoes. The 
panels show norm-zeroed discrimination models of that overall tomato-like taste (R1) by 
descriptions of (a) NaCl (S2) as salty (R2) MSG (S1), validating the method since MSG and 
NaCl contain the same sodium ion, (b) citric acid (S4) as sour MSG, (c) MSG (S1) as sourness-
lessening (R4) sucrose (S3), and (d) caffeine (S5) as bitter (R5) MSG (S1). Graphs from 
calculations by the CoPro2.29 program in Java, giving (a) and (b) below the norm point and (c) 
and (d) above. 
 
Figure 9.  Models of a response (Rm) by single types of norm-zeroed discrimination (S, SR, SSR, 
SRR, RR or R). The black rectangle contains these cognitive-affective-conative mental 
processes, labelled in the format on the input axis in graphic output from the calculator program 
(Figures 1, 2b, 7, 9). This diagram shows only one model of each type, e.g. (second downwards) 
the example of an SSR model is perceiving S2 under the description of concept R1 applied to 
stimulation S1; others models of the each type have different Sn and/or Rn components.  Outside 
that transparent black box is environmental causation, priding both material and symbolic 
affordances of stimuli and responses. Arrows point in the hypothesised direction of causation. 
 
Figure 10.  Models of the determinants of craving for chocolate (rated response R1) in two 
individuals, (a) and (b), tested on descriptions of foods varied between chocolate coating and 
cocoa flavoring (S1), high and low levels of sugar (S2), larger and small portions (S3) and  with 
or without added vitamins (S4). Each portion of food was also rated how chocolatey (R2), sweet 
(R3), comforting (R4) and healthy (R5) it was. Data pairs are numbered in the sequence of 
presentation (the same for the two participants). The discrimination scaled calculations 
constrained models to one type of process. The best model for (a) was SSR (r
2
 = 0.97), with (b) 
showing SRR processing (r2 = 0.95).  Operator +: discrimination distances added (1-d);   ¬ : root 
sum of squares of distances (between dimensions). The number below each component of the 
model on the (covert) stimulus axis is its percentage contribution to the r2 value.  Both 
dimensions of craving in (a) and (b) were dominated by sugar, in (a) either as comfortingly 
filling or healthy chocolate and in (b) as chocolate-like sweet or healthily chocolatey. 
 
Figure 11. Types of causal process within a mind (the translucent black box) during a decision 
about cooperating with or helping another person on a particular occasion.  
 
Figure 12. Rise and fall times of overlapping stages of consolidation in the adaptive synapses 
that are active at a particular moment in working memory. || Latest time for disruption of 
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retrieval by convulsive current, a short-acting anesthetic or an antibiotic such cycloheximide 
respectively. Note that reactivation of such a synapse re-starts this sequence of molecular 
processes. Electroconvulsive shock causes synchronization of synaptic activity, destroying the 
selectivity of pathway activation.  Anesthetics may interrupt the general levels of activation and 
inhibition, rendering inoperative   the threshold mechanism for selecting network paths. 
Antibiotics disrupt transcription from RNA to the proteins that change the structure of the 
synapse.  (Redrawn from Booth, 1973) 
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Figures (with captions) for full draft review 
 
[First cited on page 12]   
Figure 1. Norm-zeroed discrimination scales. Each of the three graphs (a, b, c) shows the fit to a 
hyperbola of an individual’s judgments in a single session of disparities from preferred salt level 
(S1: sodium chloride log g / 100 g of plain white bread) in one of the participants reported by 
Booth et al., 1983 (N = 30). Salty rti (R1): the first (and only) response of saltiness relative to 
ideal (scored 0) towards unacceptably low or high in salt (-50). The participants in panels b and c 
had the maximum responses furthest from ideal and yet the fitted hyperbola (continuous line) 
still rises very close to the intersection of the tangents (broken line). The plots are output from 
the Co-Pro 2.29 tool for modelling personal cognition as described in Booth and Freeman (1993) 
and this paper,       
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[Page 13]  
Figure 2. Unfolded quadratic (Coombs, 1964) versus theoretical hyperbola for: levels of sucrose 
(log M) in an orange-flavored drink (also varied in level of citric acid) in one session with an 
individual.  Panel a: unfolded quadratic function fitted by eye to data from Figure 5.3 in Booth 
(1994). Panel b: the same data fitted by CoPro to a hyperbola with center at zero score (see 
Figure 1). Mismatch to ideal was rated as always choose (score = 0) to never choose (-10). 
 
      a 
 
 Much 
    too  10-  Never choose                                                      B 
 sweet                                                                                    C 
 
                                                                   H 
 
             5-                                             | 
                                                             |     F 
                                                             | 
                                                             | 
                                                             | 
                                                             | 
  Ideal   0-  Always choose                   | 
                                                             | 
                                                             | 
                                                             | 
                                                             | 
                                                             | 
            -5-                           G               | 
 
 
    Far                    E                                                         
    too                                   D                                                  
   little -10- N.c.     A 
sweet               
                    -3.4      -3.3       -3.2       -3.1       -3.0       -2.9        -2.8 
                                                 Sucrose (log M) 
104 
 
 
 
 
 
   
                                         
 
 
 
b 
105 
 
 
[Page 18]  Figure 3. Weber’s fraction or the fractional half-discriminated disparity: (SN – SO) / 
SO, where the distributions of responses to SO and SN have superposed 75
th
 and 25
th
 percentiles, 
respectively. 
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[Page 25]  Figure 4. Continued constant concomitance supports the hypothesis that events E and 
F are causally related.  Each 2 x 2 table represents a logically possible occurrence, the top row at 
the first observation, the second row at the next observation, etc. Some ambiguous possibilities 
are omitted from the second and subsequent rows. First observed pair of events: 1. Second data 
pair: 2. Third and fourth: 3, 4. 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                  Hypothesis supported                          Hypothesis undermined 
 
 
                               Event E                Event E                      Event E               Event E 
                         Absent  Present   Absent  Present         Absent  Present   Absent  Present 
 
Event   Present                   1                                               1 
 
    F      Absent                                    1                                                                         1 
 
 
Event   Present                1  2                         1                   2            1                          1 
 
    F      Absent                                    2                                                                         2 
 
 
 
Event   Present               1  2  3                    1   2                3        1   2                      1   2 
 
    F      Absent                                    3                                                                           3 
 
 
 
Event   Present               1  2  4                    1   2                4        1   2                      1   2 
 
    F      Absent        3                      3   4                              3                           3             4 
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[Page 26]  Figure 5. Constant concomitance with quantitative observation (notional data), 
covering higher and lower ranges of a feature of each event in the sampled context. See Table 1. 
Numerals: sequence of presentation of stimulus levels. 
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[Page 29]  Figure 6. Different causal pathways (channels of information transmission) that can 
be diagnosed from a stimulus-specific response (R1) and a more integrative response (RX) to a 
stimulus (S1).  S1 values are processed as distances from a norm that also includes S2 distances.  
Each square is a type of mental event, influencing and influenced by other mental events, as 
indicated by arrows. RX may be influenced by any of the distinct stimulatory (S), conceptual (R) 
or descriptive (SR) types of mental process that use information coming from S1 and/or going to 
R1 in the environment. 
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[Page 31]   
Figure 7. Types of causal processes within a mind, on one stimulus and two responses afforded 
in the environment.  Panels (a) conceptual (R), (b) descriptive (SR), (c) meaningful (SRR), (d) 
reasoning, (e) perceptual, (f) stimulatory. 
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[Page 36]  Figure 8.  Perceptual processes (SSR) in ratings of mixtures of MSG, salt (NaCl), 
sugar (sucrose), citric acid and caffeine in tomato juice for similarity to the taste of tomatoes. 
The panels show norm-zeroed discrimination models of that overall tomato-like taste (R1) by 
descriptions of (a) NaCl (S2) as salty (R2) MSG (S1), validating the method since MSG and 
NaCl contain the same sodium ion, (b) citric acid (S4) as sour MSG, (c) MSG (S1) as sourness-
lessening (R4) sucrose (S3), and (d) caffeine (S5) as bitter (R5) MSG (S1). Graphs from 
calculations by the CoPro2.29 program in Java, giving (a) and (b) below the norm point and (c) 
and (d) above. 
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[Page 36]  Figure 9. Models of a response (Rm) by single types of norm-zeroed discrimination (S, 
SR, SSR, SRR, RR or R). The black rectangle contains these cognitive-affective-conative mental 
processes, labelled in the format on the input axis in graphic output from the calculator program 
(Figures 1, 2b, 7, 9). This diagram shows only one model of each type, e.g. (second downwards) 
the example of an SSR model is perceiving S2 under the description of concept R1 applied to 
stimulation S1; others models of the each type have different Sn and/or Rn components.  Outside 
that transparent black box is environmental causation, priding both material and symbolic 
affordances of stimuli and responses. Arrows point in the hypothesised direction of causation. 
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[Page 44] Figure 10.  Models of the determinants of craving for chocolate (rated response R1) in 
two individuals, (a) and (b), tested on descriptions of foods varied between chocolate coating and 
cocoa flavoring (S1), high and low levels of sugar (S2), larger and small portions (S3) and  with 
or without added vitamins (S4). Each portion of food was also rated how chocolatey (R2), sweet 
(R3), comforting (R4) and healthy (R5) it was. Data pairs are numbered in the sequence of 
presentation (the same for the two participants). The discrimination scaled calculations 
constrained models to one type of process. The best model for (a) was SSR (r
2
 = 0.97), with (b) 
showing SRR processing (r
2
 = 0.95).  Operator +: discrimination distances added (1-d);   ¬ : root 
sum of squares of distances (between dimensions). The number below each component of the 
model on the (covert) stimulus axis is its percentage contribution to the r2 value.  Both 
dimensions of craving in (a) and (b) were dominated by sugar, in (a) either as comfortingly 
filling or healthy chocolate and in (b) as chocolate-like sweet or healthily chocolatey. 
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[Page 45] Figure 11. Types of causal process within a mind (the translucent black box) during a 
decision about cooperating with or helping another person on a particular occasion. 
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[Page 65] Figure 12.  Rise and fall times of overlapping stages of consolidation in the adaptive 
synapses that are active at a particular moment in working memory. || Latest time for disruption 
of retrieval by convulsive current, a short-acting anesthetic or an antibiotic such cycloheximide 
respectively. Note that reactivation of such a synapse re-starts this sequence of molecular 
processes. Electroconvulsive shock causes synchronization of synaptic activity, destroying the 
selectivity of pathway activation.  Anesthetics may interrupt the general levels of activation and 
inhibition, rendering inoperative   the threshold mechanism for selecting network paths. 
Antibiotics disrupt transcription from RNA to the proteins that change the structure of the 
synapse.  (Redrawn from Booth, 1973) 
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